Littlejohn v. United States, 73 A.3d 1034

Travis Littlejohn was convicted of armed voluntary manslaughter for the stabbing death of Nadir Farooq; direct appeal upheld the conviction.
During the pendency of the direct appeal, Littlejohn filed a § 23-110 motion claiming ineffective assistance for trial counsel's failure to object to courtroom closure of his supporters.
The trial court denied the § 23-110 motion without a hearing, prompting an evidentiary remand to determine if counsel’s waiver of the public-trial right was ineffective.
At trial, a bench conference led to orders excluding Littlejohn’s friends and family from portions of the courtroom to prevent disruption; Farooq’s supporters remained indoors while Littlejohn’s were told to leave early.
Appellate briefing argued that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is personal and cannot be waived by counsel without consultation with the defendant; the record was insufficient to resolve this on direct appeal.
The reviewing court remands for an evidentiary hearing to assess whether counsel’s waiver complied with Strickland and whether the closure satisfied the Waller factors.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was trial counsel ineffective for waiving Littlejohn's public trial right?	Littlejohn argues counsel's waiver was unconsulted and prejudicial.	State argues waiver was supported by defense strategy and is not per se ineffective.	Remanded for evidentiary hearing on effectiveness
Did the courtroom closure violate the Waller four-factor test?	Closure violated open trial rights; not narrowly tailored.	Closure maintained order; alternatives contemplated but not fully explored.	Remanded to test Waller criteria at evidentiary hearing
If closure violated, is prejudice presumed due to structural error?	Structural error permits per se prejudice.	Prejudice should be analyzed under Strickland prejudice, not per se.	Court declines to resolve; remand for evidentiary findings
Should the court apply presumption of prejudice for structural errors in collateral attack?	Preserve defendant's remedies by recognizing structural error prejudice.	Maintains traditional Strickland framework; no presumption on collateral review.	Remand to determine under record whether waiver caused structural error
What is the proper procedural route for reviewing ineffective assistance claims in this context?	Collateral attack is appropriate for developing record.	Direct appeal or proper collateral approach should be followed with preserved issues.	Remand for evidentiary hearing; issue preserved for further record

Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (U.S. Supreme Court 1984) (Four-factor test for courtroom closure; interest, scope, alternatives, findings)
Tinsley v. United States, 868 A.2d 867 (D.C. 2005) (Partial closures; emphasis on open trials and prudent closure reasoning)
Kleinbart v. United States, 388 A.2d 878 (D.C. 1978) (Public trial right can be violated by substantial, unexplained closures)
Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62 (2d Cir.1997) (Open trials are strongly favored; greater justification needed for broader closures)
Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (U.S. Supreme Court 2010) (Court requires consideration of alternatives even for partial closures)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. Supreme Court 1984) (Two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficiency and prejudice)
Gonzalez-Lopez v. United States, 548 U.S. 140 (U.S. Supreme Court 2006) (Structural errors are not easily analyzed by harmless-error review)
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (U.S. Supreme Court 1993) (Structural right analysis; public trial as a basic protection)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (U.S. Supreme Court 1993) (Limits on harmless-error review for structural defects)