447 P.3d 375
Kan.2019Background
- Kedrin D. Littlejohn participated in a 2008 robbery in which the victim was shot, kidnapped, and killed; Littlejohn was convicted of felony murder and related charges and his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
- Pretrial records contained evidence of very low IQ testing (a 2006 report indicating a full-scale IQ of 49 and a 2009 evaluation with full-scale IQ ~71) and expert testimony indicating severe deficits; the trial defense did not pursue a mental-defect/mental-retardation defense or request related jury instructions.
- Littlejohn filed an initial K.S.A. 60-1507 postconviction motion in 2014 (summarily denied); he filed a second 60-1507 motion in January 2015 alleging ineffective assistance for failure to pursue a mental-defect defense among other claims.
- The district court denied the second motion as successive and an abuse of remedy without appointing counsel; the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, applying a standard that allowed consideration of any colorable claim in a successive motion.
- The State petitioned for review to the Kansas Supreme Court arguing the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect standard for second or successive 60-1507 motions; the Supreme Court agreed and remanded for reconsideration under the correct standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a movant must show "exceptional circumstances" to avoid dismissal of a second or successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion | Littlejohn argued his ineffective-assistance claims (including failure to pursue mental-defect defense) amounted to exceptional circumstances permitting review | State argued precedent requires a showing of exceptional circumstances before a second/successive 60-1507 is considered | Court held precedent requires movants to show exceptional circumstances (including weighing whether justice would be served) and the Court of Appeals applied the wrong, more permissive standard |
| Whether Supreme Court Rule 183(d) eliminates the "exceptional circumstances" requirement | Littlejohn/Ct. of Appeals: Rule 183(d) allows consideration of successive motions if any colorable claim is asserted | State: Rule 183(d) must be read with statute and caselaw requiring exceptional circumstances; Rule 183(d)(3) is part of the exceptional-circumstances analysis | Court held Rule 183(d) does not displace the exceptional-circumstances rule; Rule 183(d)(3)’s "justice" inquiry is incorporated into that analysis |
| Whether the Court of Appeals properly created a "colorable claim" test for successive motions | Littlejohn/COA applied a test that any colorable claim requires merits consideration | State objected that this novel test conflicts with Kansas precedent | Court rejected the colorable-claim test as unsupported and inconsistent with precedent |
| Procedural adequacy of district court denial (appointment of counsel issue) | Littlejohn argued district court erred by summarily denying without appointing counsel after receiving State response | State defended the district court's handling | Supreme Court did not address or resolve the appointment-of-counsel issue (Littlejohn did not cross-petition); issue not before the Court |
Key Cases Cited
- Dunlap v. State, 221 Kan. 268 (1977) (second/successive 60-1507 should not be entertained absent constitutional error and exceptional circumstances)
- State v. Littlejohn, 298 Kan. 632 (2014) (direct-appeal opinion describing trial facts and proceedings)
- Sola-Morales v. State, 300 Kan. 875 (2014) (standard of review for summary denial of 60-1507 is de novo)
- Nguyen v. State, 309 Kan. 96 (2018) (confirmed movant must establish exceptional circumstances; Rule 183(d)(3) and "justice" inquiry are incorporated into that analysis)
- Beauclair v. State, 308 Kan. 284 (2018) (actual innocence based on victim recantation can constitute exceptional circumstances permitting a successive motion)