Littlejohn v. City of New York, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13475

Background

Dawn Littlejohn, an African‑American who served as ACS Director of EEO, was reassigned and demoted in March 2011 from EEO Director to a non‑managerial analyst role and lost pay; she alleges she was replaced by a white woman with less EEO experience.
Littlejohn complained repeatedly to ACS supervisors (Amy Baker and John Mattingly) about alleged racial discrimination during an ACS/Department of Juvenile Justice merger and about preferential treatment of white employees.
After the demotion she was supervised by Brandon Stradford, whom she later alleged repeatedly sexually harassed her; she raised complaints internally and sent a letter to the EEOC mentioning sexual harassment after filing an EEOC charge alleging race discrimination.
Littlejohn filed an EEOC Intake Questionnaire and a formal charge alleging race/color discrimination and retaliation (but did not initially allege sex discrimination or name Stradford); she later received a right‑to‑sue letter and sued under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983.
The district court dismissed all claims for failure to state a claim and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies on the sexual‑harassment count; the Second Circuit vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Disparate treatment (demotion) — Title VII	Littlejohn: demotion and replacement by a white employee plausibly infer racial discrimination.	Defendants: pleadings lack facts showing discriminatory motive; no direct evidence.	Court: pleadings plausibly allege prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas/Iqbal because replacement by a non‑protected employee supports inference; claim survives vs. City (Title VII) and vs. Baker (§§ 1981, 1983).
Individual and municipal liability (§§ 1981, 1983)	Littlejohn: supervisors and City liable for demotion.	Defendants: individual supervisors not personally involved; municipal liability requires policy/custom (Monell).	Court: dismiss claims against Mattingly and Stradford (no personal involvement); §1981/§1983 survive only against Baker (personal role); Monell claim against City fails for §1981/§1983.
Retaliation for opposing discrimination	Littlejohn: her complaints during the merger were protected opposition and demotion was retaliatory; temporal proximity supports causation.	Defendants: internal complaints were part of job duties and not protected; no causal link.	Court: complaints qualified as protected activity under §704(a)’s opposition clause (Crawford/Sumner); alleged close temporal sequence adequately pleads causation; retaliation claim survives vs. City (Title VII) and vs. Baker (§1981).
Sexual harassment (Stradford) — exhaustion	Littlejohn: later letter to EEOC and internal complaint put EEOC on notice of sexual harassment.	Defendants: EEOC charge did not allege sex harassment or name Stradford; claim not reasonably related and thus unexhausted.	Court: sexual‑harassment claim dismissed for failure to exhaust—unsworn letter could not amend the unrelated race charge into a sex‑harassment charge.

Key Cases Cited

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (prima facie burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (notice pleading in employment discrimination suits)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (plausibility standard for pleadings)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading must be plausible on its face)
Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271 (opposition clause protects complaints to employer)
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires policy or custom)
Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (hostile work environment standard)
Zimmermann v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376 (replacement by someone outside protected class supports inference of discrimination)
Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203 (opposition clause covers informal complaints and support of co‑workers)