Little v. Shell Exploration & Production Co.
690 F.3d 282
5th Cir.2012Background
- Relators Little and Arnold, government auditors for MMS, filed two qui tam actions against Shell in Oklahoma alleging $19 million in improper royalty deductions on offshore leases.
- The information giving rise to the suits was uncovered by the relators in the course of their official duties and reported as a job requirement before filing.
- The government declined to intervene; the actions were unsealed and transferred to the Southern District of Texas, where they were consolidated.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Shell, relying on the public-disclosure bar and the scope of who may sue under the FCA, §3730(b)(1) and §3730(e)(4).
- Relators appeal, with amicus United States urging that federal employees can be FCA qui tam relators and that the public-disclosure bar must be narrowly applied.
- The majority reverses the district court on standing and remands for reconsideration of the public-disclosure issue and related questions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who may bring a FCA qui tam action | Little/Arnold contend a federal employee may sue as a 'person'. | Shell and the United States argue federal employees are excluded by 'private persons'. | A federal employee may bring a qui tam action; the statute permits 'a person' to sue. |
| Public disclosure bar applicability | Disclosures identified do not bar the action because specifics were not publicly disclosed. | Public disclosures bar jurisdiction unless relator is an original source. | Remand to determine if public disclosures actually cover the alleged scheme and whether relators are original sources. |
| Original source requirement following public disclosures | If there is no public disclosure, original source status is irrelevant; if there is, the relator must be an original source. | Original source cannot be met where public disclosures exist and the relator learned of the fraud in the course of government service. | If a public disclosure is found on remand, relators cannot be original sources and the action would be dismissed. |
| Constitutional standing of government employees as relators | Relators have Article III standing as assignees of the government’s claim or through other theories. | Standing may be deficient if employee-relators cannot redress their injury or are not proper assignors. | Standing exists for federal-employee relators under the FCA. |
| Conflict with other statutes (ethics/recusal) not dispositive | Ethics and conflict-of-interest provisions could be reconciled with FCA standing. | Conflicts undermine FCA relator status or require narrower interpretations of 'person'. | Conflict-of-interest considerations do not override the FCA's text; the court leaves those concerns for another time. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States ex rel. Stevens v. United States, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) (qui tam standing for non-government relators; history supports standing)
- Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008) (assignee-based redressability; focuses on injury redressability)
- McKesson Corp. v. Doe, 649 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2011) (public disclosure bar requires substantial disclosure aligned with complaint)
- Fort v. Cook Cnty., 538 U.S. 119 (2003) (statutory term 'person' extends to natural persons and certain entities)
- United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 1995) (original source analysis in public-disclosure context)
- United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (government employee relators addressed in circuit split)