Little Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Sandy City
2016 UT 45
| Utah | 2016Background
- Five canal companies held primary Little Cottonwood Creek water rights by 1856; a 1878 contract granted one-tenth of the water to railroad interests for $25/month, later assigned to Salt Lake County Water Company (SLCWC).
- Litigation culminating in the 1910 Little Cottonwood Morse Decree adjudicated all primary water rights and terminated the 1878 contract, replacing it with decree terms granting SLCWC (and successors) one-tenth of the primary water in exchange for $75/month; forfeiture and attorneys’ fees provisions were included.
- SLCWC’s rights passed to Sandy Irrigation Company and Sandy City, who paid under the Morse Decree for roughly a century.
- In 2013 three canal companies filed a postjudgment motion in the original 1910 action seeking to modify the Morse Decree to increase monthly payments (seeking reformation to account for inflation/value), rather than filing a new complaint.
- The district court denied the motion, concluding it lacked authority under Rule 60(b) and common law to reopen and modify an adjudication of rights via postjudgment motion; the canal companies appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a district court has common-law authority to modify a water decree via postjudgment motion | Canal companies: water decrees are unique; courts retain inherent/common-law continuing jurisdiction to modify decrees at any time | Sandy: final-judgment rule limits postjudgment modification; only narrow exceptions (rules or injunctive/admin parts) permit changes | Court: No. Common-law continuing authority exists only for injunctive or administrative (infrastructure) aspects, not to reopen adjudicated rights by motion |
| Whether the Morse Decree itself reserved broad continuing jurisdiction to modify the contractual payment terms | Canal companies: paragraph 39’s reservation of the commissioner’s powers and court supervision shows retained control over preceding decree terms, authorizing modification | Sandy: paragraph 39 is a qualification of the commissioner’s distributive powers, not a reservation to modify adjudicated rights; decree doesn’t authorize postjudgment modification | Court: No. Paragraph 39 governs commissioner administration/distribution and court supervision thereof, not power to alter adjudicated contractual rights by motion; motion inappropriate — must pursue other procedures (e.g., new action) |
Key Cases Cited
- Orderville Irrigation Co. v. Glendale Irrigation Co., 409 P.2d 616 (Utah 1965) (water decrees allow judicial clarification/enforcement and courts retain continuing jurisdiction to enforce or clarify decree ambiguities)
- Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co., 174 P. 1134 (Utah 1918) (court may modify portions of a decree concerning ongoing administration of infrastructure and apportionment of operating costs)
- Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (U.S. 1961) (injunctive decrees often require continuing supervision and courts may modify injunctions as circumstances change)
- Berman v. Yarbrough, 267 P.3d 905 (Utah 2011) (a court’s power to enforce a judgment is confined to the judgment’s four corners; enforcement motions cannot be used to alter substantive terms)