Lister v. City of Wichita, 666 F. App'x 709

James L. Lister, pro se, alleged Title VII race discrimination and retaliation by the City of Wichita arising from his termination on or about September 23, 2014.
He filed an administrative charge with the Kansas Human Rights Commission on October 13, 2015 — 85 days after the 300-day deadline for Kansas residents — and the charge was dismissed as untimely.
Lister sued in federal district court on February 4, 2016; the City moved to dismiss as time‑barred, and the district court granted the motion and entered judgment on June 23, 2016.
Lister filed a combined Rule 59(e) motion (seeking amendment under Rule 15) and a document purporting to give notice of appeal on July 12, 2016; the district court denied the Rule 59(e) motion on July 22, 2016, but Lister did not file a new notice of appeal from that denial.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held Lister’s July 12 filing functioned as a timely notice of appeal from the June 23 judgment but was insufficient to preserve review of the later Rule 59(e) order.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed: (1) dismissal as time‑barred because Lister’s Title VII claim accrued by the termination date and his administrative charge was filed after the 300‑day period, and (2) denial of appointed counsel was not an abuse of discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Lister’s filing a sufficient notice of appeal?	The July 12 filing served as notice of appeal to Tenth Circuit.	The filing was not a proper notice for all post‑judgment orders.	Yes as to the June 23 judgment; no as to the later Rule 59(e) order.
Were Lister’s Title VII claims timely (administrative exhaustion)?	Harassment and termination claims accrued later; his charge was timely.	Claims accrued no later than termination on Sept. 23, 2014; charge was filed after 300 days.	Claims accrued by termination date; administrative charge was untimely; dismissal affirmed.
Did the district court have jurisdiction to review the Rule 59(e) denial on appeal?	The July 12 papers preserved the Rule 59(e) denial for appeal.	A separate notice was required after the district court ruled on Rule 59(e).	No jurisdiction to review the July 22 Rule 59(e) denial because no post‑order notice was filed.
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying appointed counsel?	Lister needed counsel and met factors favoring appointment.	Court properly applied Castner factors and reasonably declined given likely time‑bar.	No abuse of discretion; denial affirmed.

Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992) (Rule 3 construed liberally; functional equivalent may suffice for notice of appeal)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleading)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard and plausibility analysis)
Proctor v. United Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2007) (accrual date for Title VII filing period typically when adverse decision is communicated)
Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007) (failure to meet Title VII filing deadline bars suit)
Coll v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 876 (10th Cir. 2011) (notice of appeal filed before resolution of post‑judgment motion does not preserve later order absent a new notice)
Breeden v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 115 F.3d 749 (10th Cir. 1997) (appeal from final judgment does not automatically cover later post‑judgment motions decided after notice)
Castner v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, 979 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1992) (factors guiding appointment of counsel in employment discrimination suits)
Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373 (10th Cir. 1994) (appeal from final judgment supports review of earlier interlocutory orders merged into final judgment)
Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C. v. Wells Fargo Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 771 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2014) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals)