498 S.W.3d 882
Tenn. Ct. App.2016Background
- Lisa Odom and Scott Odom were divorced and shared custody of one child; an affidavit of complaint for custodial interference was filed against Lisa after she allegedly removed the child from Tennessee to California.
- Deputies executed an order to return the child to Scott at the home of Lisa’s father, William Phipps; Lisa objected and Phipps asked to see a warrant.
- After a prolonged confrontation, Assistant District Attorney General Amanda Sammons was placed on speakerphone and advised deputies a warrant was unnecessary because of a court order; Lisa overheard Sammons call her a “jerk,” a “troublemaker,” and say “take that bitch to jail.”
- Lisa was arrested for custodial interference; the criminal charge was later dismissed.
- Lisa and Phipps sued Sammons (among others) alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and civil conspiracy to violate Tennessee constitutional rights (invoking Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17); Sammons moved to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6).
- The trial court dismissed both claims; on appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the derogatory remarks did not meet the high IIED standard and that Article I, § 17 does not create a private substantive cause of action for constitutional violations; immunity/individual liability issues were pretermitted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sammons committed IIED by her speakerphone remarks | Sammons’ insults were intentional/reckless, outrageous, and caused serious emotional harm | Remarks were mere insults not meeting the extreme-outrage standard | Dismissed: insults insufficient for IIED; plaintiffs cannot state a claim |
| Whether Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17 creates a private cause of action for constitutional violations / civil conspiracy claim | Art. I, § 17 authorizes suits to redress injuries from state actors for constitutional violations | Art. I, § 17 provides access to courts but does not create a substantive private right or cause of action | Dismissed: no implied substantive cause of action under Art. I, § 17 for constitutional violations |
| Whether Sammons has absolute prosecutorial immunity for alleged conspiracy to violate constitutional rights | Plaintiffs argued conspiracy liability could attach to a state actor | Sammons asserted absolute prosecutorial immunity for initiating/pursuing prosecutions | Not decided on merits—court pretermitted because underlying claims were dismissed |
| Whether Sammons is individually liable | Plaintiffs sought individual liability for her conduct on speakerphone | Sammons argued dismissal of claims and immunity shield individual liability | Not decided on merits—pretermitted due to dismissal of claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196 (Tenn. 2012) (sets elements of IIED and outrageous conduct standard)
- Staples v. Brown, 85 S.W. 254 (Tenn. 1905) (Article I, § 17 guarantees access to courts but does not create new substantive rights)
- Simmons v. Gath Baptist Church, 109 S.W.3d 370 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (discusses prosecutorial immunity for actions in initiating prosecutions)
- Willett v. Ford, 603 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) (recognizes prosecutorial immunity principles)
- Highwoods Props., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695 (Tenn. 2009) (procedural standard for Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss)
- Brown v. Tenn. Title Loans, Inc., 328 S.W.3d 850 (Tenn. 2010) (pleading admissions and standard when considering a motion to dismiss)