87 F.4th 994
9th Cir.2023Background
- Tinder charged older users higher subscription prices for Tinder Plus/Gold (age-tiered pricing introduced 2015); this spawned consumer class litigation.
- Tinder implemented a sign‑in "wrap" Terms of Use (TOU) that included a Texas choice‑of‑law clause, arbitration provision, and class‑action waiver; Tinder later attempted to apply an amended TOU retroactively.
- Separate state action (Candelore) survived demurrer; Kim sued in federal court making substantially similar Unruh Act and UCL claims.
- The district court compelled arbitration as to Kim (based on post‑TOU logins) but not (at least as yet) for over 7,000 putative class members; parties reached a class settlement that the district court approved after a Ninth Circuit remand from an earlier reversal (Kim I).
- Objectors (Allison, Frye) argued Kim was an inadequate class representative because she was subject to arbitration, had a conflict of interest with non‑arbitrable class members, and had not vigorously litigated the claims; the Ninth Circuit agreed, vacated approval of the revised settlement, and remanded (leaving only Kim’s individual action to arbitration).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adequacy — conflict of interest under Rule 23(a)(4) | Kim: no disabling conflict; her claims are typical and aligned with class interests | Tinder/District Court: typicality and shared goals suffice; arbitration status not fatal | Held: Kim had a fundamental conflict — she is arbitrable (and thus cannot face trial) while a non‑trivial subset of class members may not be — so she is inadequate |
| Adequacy — vigor of prosecution | Kim: case was actively litigated and parties engaged in discovery and motion practice | Tinder: settlement reached after litigation and procedural history; court found vigor | Held: Kim did not vigorously prosecute — discovery before settlement was minimal and she failed to timely raise formation/unconscionability arguments against the TOU |
| Fairness of the revised settlement under Rule 23(e) | Kim/class counsel: revised settlement and fee structure are fair and reasonable | Objectors: settlement shows indicia of collusion and places minority (but sizable) non‑arbitrable claims at risk | Held: Because the named plaintiff was inadequate, district court abused its discretion in approving the settlement; approval vacated and case remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (U.S. 1997) (named plaintiffs with differing, conflicting interests can render representation inadequate)
- Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2010) (prior settlement by named plaintiff can conflict with interests of absent class members and defeat adequacy)
- Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) (standards for class certification and assessment of counsel’s vigor in settlement-only classes)
- In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prods. Liab. Litig., 895 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2018) (conflicts inquiry and class settlement scrutiny)
- Kim v. Allison, 8 F.4th 1170 (9th Cir. 2021) (earlier panel decision reversing district court approval of initial settlement and remanding for a more probing inquiry)
- In re Online DVD‑Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 942 (9th Cir.) (adequacy/vigor of prosecution discussed in settlement‑class context)
