Lisa E. Burris v. James Morton Burris
2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 698
Tenn. Ct. App.2016Background
- Lisa Burris (Mother) and James Burris (Father) divorced in 2008; Mother was ordered to pay monthly child support, share medical expenses, and had an existing arrearage.
- Over several post-divorce proceedings, child support orders were modified multiple times; disputes continued and Father filed criminal contempt petitions alleging willful failure to pay support and medical bills and refusal to permit visitation.
- After a May 26, 2015 contempt hearing, the chancery court found Mother guilty of 37 counts of criminal contempt (medical bills, child support, and one visitation violation) and sentenced her to 10 days per count plus revoked suspended time for a total of 403 days.
- Mother filed a timely Rule 59.04 motion (filed as a motion to vacate) presenting: (1) challenge to willfulness findings, (2) newly obtained evidence that she could pay (employment and a sister’s loan), and (3) that the 403-day sentence was excessive. The trial court denied relief; Mother appealed denial of her post-trial motion.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the contempt findings (Mother failed to provide a transcript or statement of evidence, so trial court findings are presumed correct) and affirmed denial as to newly offered post-trial evidence, but vacated/ remanded as to excessiveness of sentence because the trial court’s order lacked statutory citation, factual findings, and any analysis of concurrent vs. consecutive sentencing or the sentencing factors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Burris) | Defendant's Argument (James Burris) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mother’s failure to pay was willful | Burris: nonpayment was not willful; asserted inability and other facts showing lack of ability to pay | Father: Mother had ability to pay; trial court found willfulness (citing payments made) | Affirmed: willfulness finding upheld — appellant failed to provide transcript/statement of evidence, so trial court findings presumed correct |
| Whether post-trial/new evidence (employment/loan) warranted relief under Rule 59.04 | Burris: after the hearing she secured employment and a loan from her sister to cure arrears, so judgment should be altered | Father: evidence arose after trial or could have been discovered earlier; not grounds for Rule 59.04 relief | Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion — facts occurred after trial or were not shown to be newly discoverable |
| Whether statutory sentencing limits (Tenn. Code §36‑5‑104) capped contempt punishment | Burris: Ahern suggests 6 months is the maximum for child support-related punishment | Father: contempt was prosecuted under Title 29 (general contempt statutes), which allows up to 10 days per count | Held: Section 36‑5‑104 is a separate criminal statute, not exclusive; Title 29 contempt power remains available, so six‑month limit of §36‑5‑104 does not automatically cap Title 29 contempt sentences |
| Whether the 403‑day sentence is excessive and whether trial court complied with Rule 52.01 | Burris: sentence is excessive; trial court should have considered concurrency/suspension and statutory sentencing factors | Father: sentence within trial court discretion; notice referenced Title 29 contempt and 10 days per count | Vacated in part and remanded: trial court failed to make required findings of fact/conclusions of law and did not analyze concurrent vs. consecutive sentencing or sentencing factors; remand required to assess excessiveness |
Key Cases Cited
- Ahern v. Ahern, 15 S.W.3d 73 (Tenn. 2000) (defines criminal contempt and distinguishes contempt procedures/rights)
- Cottingham v. Cottingham, 193 S.W.3d 531 (Tenn. 2006) (willfulness requires ability to pay child support when due)
- In re Sneed, 302 S.W.3d 825 (Tenn. 2010) (approves multiple ten‑day contempt sentences and requires sentencing court to decide concurrent vs. consecutive)
- Simpkins v. Simpkins, 374 S.W.3d 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (framework for assessing excessiveness of multiple contempt sentences; consider § 40‑35‑103 factors and presumption favoring concurrency)
- Brown v. Latham, 914 S.W.2d 887 (Tenn. 1996) (characterizes § 36‑5‑104 as a separate criminal statute entitling defendants to criminal‑procedure protections)