Lisa Barton v. Dr. Steven Sandifer, D.c.
49516-3
| Wash. Ct. App. | Jul 25, 2017Background
- In July 2014 Lisa Barton underwent two chiropractic treatments by Dr. Steven Sandifer; two days after the second treatment she suffered strokes and was hospitalized.
- Barton signed an informed consent form that listed “stroke” as an “extremely rare” risk and acknowledged having read (or had read to her) the form.
- Barton later alleged Sandifer called in January 2015 apologizing and saying his treatment had caused her stroke.
- Barton sued in February 2016 for medical malpractice and lack of informed consent; the trial court set expert disclosure and dispositive motion deadlines.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Barton produced no competent expert testimony on breach, causation, or the materiality/likelihood of stroke risk; the superior court granted summary judgment and dismissed all claims with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Barton produced sufficient evidence of breach of the standard of care (medical malpractice) | Sandifer’s January apology admitting he caused the stroke shows negligence and creates a factual dispute | No expert testimony proves what the standard of care required or how Sandifer breached it; apology is insufficient evidence of breach | Summary judgment affirmed: apology does not substitute for required expert proof of breach |
| Whether Barton produced sufficient evidence of proximate causation for malpractice | The apology and factual circumstances raise a triable issue as to causation | No expert evidence tying the chiropractic manipulation to stroke; plaintiff bears burden after defendant’s showing of absence of evidence | Court did not reach causation merits because plaintiff failed to prove breach (an essential element) |
| Whether Barton established a prima facie lack of informed consent claim | The consent form’s listing of stroke as an “extremely rare” risk shows materiality and allows rebutting the presumption of informed consent | Plaintiff signed the consent form; materiality (existence, likelihood, and type of harm) requires expert proof which plaintiff did not provide | Summary judgment affirmed: plaintiff failed to produce expert testimony on materiality/likelihood and did not show she was uninformed of the risk |
| Whether summary judgment ruling was premature because before expert disclosure deadline | Barton argued motion was premature and sought more time | Barton did not request a CR 56(f) continuance and represented she did not want a continuance | Court found no abuse: plaintiff waived claim of unfairness by not seeking continuance and by her statements to the court |
Key Cases Cited
- Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358 (expert testimony generally required to prove medical-malpractice standard of care)
- Backlund v. Univ. of Wash., 137 Wn.2d 651 (elements and objective test for lack of informed consent)
- Smith v. Shannon, 100 Wn.2d 26 (expert proof required to establish existence, likelihood, and nature of risk)
- Seybold v. Neu, 105 Wn. App. 666 (informed-consent materiality requires expert testimony on risk existence and likelihood)
- Lee v. Metro Parks Tacoma, 183 Wn. App. 961 (summary-judgment procedure and burden shifting)
- Repin v. State, 198 Wn. App. 243 (complete failure of proof on an essential element makes other facts immaterial)
- White v. Kent Medical Center, Inc., 61 Wn. App. 163 (expert need not use phrase ‘standard of care’ — substance matters)
- Bauer v. White, 95 Wn. App. 663 (rare exception when medical facts are within lay observation)