Lisa Barr v. Board of Trustees of Western, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14128

Lisa Barr, a tenure-track journalism professor at Western Illinois University (2007–2010), alleged nonrenewal of her contract was retaliatory after she complained of racial discrimination in 2008.
Barr filed a pro se Title VII suit against the University in March 2010 alleging retaliation; she failed to serve the defendant and did not respond to the magistrate judge’s order to show cause.
While the first suit was pending (but unserved), Barr obtained an EEOC right-to-sue notice on additional claims (age and sex discrimination) and, represented by counsel, filed a second suit in June 2010 against the Board of Trustees asserting retaliation and ADEA claims.
The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the first case for failure to prosecute under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); the district court dismissed it with prejudice under Rule 41(b).
The Board of Trustees raised res judicata as an affirmative defense in the second case and moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c); the district court granted the motion and dismissed Barr’s second suit.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that dismissal for failure to prosecute is a final judgment on the merits and the two suits arose from the same core operative facts (the nonrenewal), so res judicata barred the second action.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the first dismissal bars the second suit under res judicata	Barr: first suit wasn’t on the merits (it was unserved) and second suit asserts different claims based on later EEOC notice	Board: dismissal under Rule 41(b) is a merits judgment and both suits arise from the same core facts	Held: Yes; dismissal for failure to prosecute is a final judgment on the merits and precludes the second suit
Whether the causes of action are identical for preclusion purposes	Barr: claims differ (harassment vs. termination; new age/sex claims)	Board: claims share same core operative facts (nonrenewal) despite different theories	Held: Identity of causes satisfied because both suits stem from same operative facts (nonrenewal)
Whether exhaustion requirement justifies separate lawsuits	Barr: needed a right-to-sue letter before bringing age/sex claims	Board: plaintiff could have amended or sought a stay of the earlier case until right-to-sue issued	Held: Exhaustion does not excuse claim-splitting; stay or amendment available
Whether pro se filing insulates plaintiff from preclusion	Barr: initial pro se status makes dismissal a harsh procedural consequence	Board: plaintiff obtained counsel and pursued second suit before appealing first dismissal	Held: Pro se status does not avoid res judicata; failure to appeal or seek relief preserved the dismissal as final

Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1979) (final judgment precludes relitigation of claims that were or could have been raised)
Palka v. City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 2011) (preclusion bars claim-splitting in employment-discrimination suits)
Czarniecki v. City of Chicago, 633 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2011) (claims are precluded when allegations are essentially the same)
Hermann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., 999 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1993) (tests for identity of claims focus on factual overlap)
Hayes v. City of Chicago, 670 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 2012) (standard of review for Rule 12(c) motions)
Tartt v. Nw. Cmty. Hosp., 453 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2006) (Rule 41(b) dismissal operates as final judgment for res judicata)
Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 649 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2011) (identity of cause of action depends on core operative facts)
Smith v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1987) (different theories arising from same facts can constitute a single cause of action)
Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1982) (one group of facts may give rise to different claims but remain a single cause of action)
Lowe v. City of East Chicago, Ind., 897 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1990) (dismissal for failure to prosecute may properly be without prejudice in some circumstances)