Linza v. Saul, 990 F.3d 243

Stephen Linza was a National Guard "dual status technician" (federal civilian employee required to maintain Guard membership) who worked from 1977–2008 as an aircraft mechanic/trainer.
Linza receives three retirement streams: a military pension (some of which was covered), a Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) annuity based on his noncovered civilian technician pay, and Social Security retirement benefits.
The SSA reduced Linza’s Social Security benefits under the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) because of his CSRS annuity; SSA did not reduce benefits for Linza’s military pension under the uniformed service exception.
Linza challenged the WEP reduction, arguing the CSRS annuity was “a payment based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service” (42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A)(III)); the district court agreed and remanded for benefits recalculation.
The Second Circuit reversed, holding the CSRS annuity for dual status technicians is not based wholly on uniformed service because the dual status technician position is a federal civilian appointment and the pension is tied to civilian employment.
The court resolved the case on the plain statutory text (no need to decide agency-deference issues) and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a CSRS pension for a dual status technician is "a payment based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service" under 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A)(III).	Linza: Dual status technicians perform their work as members of the Guard; pension is therefore wholly based on uniformed service.	SSA: Dual status technicians are federal civilian employees; the CSRS annuity is tied to civilian employment and thus not wholly based on uniformed service.	The CSRS annuity is not based wholly on uniformed service; WEP reduction was proper as to the civil-service pension.
Whether agency deference (Chevron/Skidmore) controls the statutory interpretation.	Linza: statutory language can be read in his favor; district court relied on precedent consistent with that view.	SSA: agency interpretation supports a contrary reading and should be considered.	Court decided the case on the statute’s plain meaning and did not rely on or decide the level of deference owed to the agency.

Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020) (explains ‘‘based on’’ normally implies a but-for causal relation)
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) (definition of "based on" and causal reading of statutory language)
Petersen v. Astrue, 633 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2011) (held dual status technician pensions qualified for the uniformed service exception)
Martin v. Social Sec. Admin., 903 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 2018) (held dual status technician pensions do not qualify for the uniformed service exception)
Kientz v. Comm’r, SSA, 954 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2020) (joined the view that dual status civilian pensions fall outside the uniformed service exception)
Newton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 983 F.3d 643 (3d Cir. 2020) (same)
Overton v. N.Y. State Div. of Mil. & Naval Affs., 373 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizes dual status technicians hold distinct civilian capacities and duties)
Rudykoff v. Apfel, 193 F.3d 579 (2d Cir. 1999) (explains windfall concern and WEP purpose)