Linyi Bonn Flooring Manufacturing Co. v. United States
2017 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 47
Ct. Intl. Trade2017Background
- Commerce conducted a 2012–2013 new shipper review (NSR) and a concurrent second periodic administrative review of the antidumping duty order on multilayered wood flooring from the PRC.
- Linyi Bonn participated in an NSR and received a zero dumping margin based on one sale/entry within the NSR POR; two other NSR participants (Huade, Fuerjia) also received zero margins.
- Commerce initiated the administrative review covering a one-year POR that overlapped the NSR POR; the Initiation Notice required a 60‑day “no shipment” certification only for firms with no exports/sales/entries during the one‑year POR.
- In the administrative review’s Final Results Commerce placed Linyi Bonn in the PRC‑wide entity and assigned the adverse rate 58.84%, but allowed Huade and Fuerjia to retain their zero NSR margins after they filed certifications stating their only POR shipments were reviewed in their NSRs.
- Linyi Bonn attempted to file a “partial no shipment certification” after the preliminary results; Commerce rejected it as untimely and assigned the PRC‑wide rate. Linyi Bonn sued; the Court found Commerce failed to give notice of the special ‘‘partial no shipment’’ procedure and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Commerce lawfully assigned Linyi Bonn the PRC‑wide rate in the administrative review | Linyi Bonn argued Commerce unlawfully applied 58.84% because it had obtained a zero margin in the NSR and Commerce failed to notify it of the procedure to retain that NSR result in the administrative review | The Government argued Commerce permissibly rejected Linyi Bonn’s late submission and that Linyi Bonn failed to rebut the PRC‑control presumption (no separate rate application) | Court held assignment was unlawful: Commerce failed to provide notice of a partial no‑shipment procedure that would have allowed Linyi Bonn to retain its NSR zero rate; remand required |
| Whether Commerce properly rejected Linyi Bonn’s January 22, 2015 submission as untimely | Linyi Bonn argued the late filing should have been accepted (or excused) because Commerce never disclosed the applicable procedure and the submission simply confirmed CBP data already on record | Government argued regulations required timeliness and Commerce permissibly exercised discretion to reject untimely factual information | Court held that rejection, viewed under the circumstances, was prejudicial because Commerce had not announced the special procedure; untimeliness alone did not justify imposing the PRC‑wide rate |
| Whether failure to file a separate rate application justified PRC‑wide treatment | Government emphasized Initiation Notice required separate rate applications and Linyi Bonn did not file one during the administrative review | Linyi Bonn said it provided required evidence in the concurrent NSR and should not have been forced to file a separate rate application if Commerce had disclosed the alternative certification route | Court held that absence of a separate rate application does not excuse Commerce’s failure to notify of the partial‑certification procedure; Commerce had treated Huade and Fuerjia differently and Linyi Bonn was prejudiced |
| Appropriate remedy | Linyi Bonn sought reinstatement of its zero margin/cash‑deposit rate and corrective action | Government supported upholding agency practice and deadlines | Court ordered remand: Commerce must reconsider, afford Linyi Bonn opportunity to retain NSR result (admit certification or equivalent), file remand redetermination within 45 days, and address effectuating instructions to CBP |
Key Cases Cited
- Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 53 F.3d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (agency may not impose adverse consequences after failing to provide notice of a procedure)
- Intercargo Ins. Co. v. United States, 83 F.3d 391 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (harmless‑error/prejudice standard for procedural errors)
- Transcom Inc. v. United States, 294 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (burden of rebutting NME government‑control presumption lies with respondent)
