Lineham v. Hyde
467 S.W.3d 129
Ark.2015Background
- David Lineham and Sarah Hyde consented in 2009 to W.L.’s grandparents (the Hydes) becoming guardians so W.L. could access the Hydes’ military benefits; W.L. thereafter lived with the Hydes in Arkansas.
- David filed to terminate the guardianship in December 2010; a 2012 hearing resulted in an order denying termination (David did not appeal that order).
- Sarah later filed to terminate the guardianship (Oct. 2012); proceedings were consolidated with related paternity/custody filings and a two-day hearing occurred in Aug. 2013.
- The probate court, in a subsequent letter opinion, concluded David had been and remained unfit and denied termination; the court also found Sarah unfit (she did not appeal).
- The Arkansas Supreme Court held that (1) a guardianship is no longer necessary when a fit parent revokes consent and (2) the probate court’s findings that David was unfit were clearly erroneous, reversed the denial of termination, and remanded to terminate the guardianship and award custody to David.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a fit parent’s revocation of prior consent to a guardianship alone satisfies the statutory ground that the guardianship is "no longer necessary" | Lineham: A fit parent who revokes consent has met the statutory "no longer necessary" prong and the guardianship should terminate without further proof. | Hydes/court: The court retains discretion under § 28‑65‑401(b)(3); revocation does not automatically require termination—best-interest inquiry and court discretion remain. | The court held revocation by a fit parent is sufficient under the statute to show the guardianship is no longer necessary; prior contrary multi-step tests are overruled. |
| Whether the circuit court could retroactively declare David unfit in its later order | Lineham: The court lacked authority to retroactively modify its earlier order beyond the Rule 60(a) 90‑day window. | Court/defendants: The later opinion correctly characterized the earlier findings as amounting to unfitness. | The court held the probate court had no jurisdiction to retroactively declare David unfit and that doing so was erroneous. |
| Whether the probate court’s factual finding that David remained unfit at the second hearing was supported by the evidence | Lineham: He corrected earlier shortcomings (employment, frequent visits, regular contact, summer stays) and is fit. | Hydes/court: Past lack of support, poor communication, specific conduct (e.g., lying about plans, failing to share medical info) show continuing unfitness. | The court found the unfitness finding clearly erroneous on review and concluded David is a fit parent. |
| Custody priority between competing parents after guardianship termination | Lineham: As the fit parent, he is presumptively acting in the child’s best interest and should receive custody over an adjudicated unfit parent. | Hydes/court: The probate court had discretion and factual basis to deny custody to David despite revocation. | The court held that because Sarah was found unfit (unchallenged) and David is fit, custody should be awarded to David; remanded to enter orders terminating guardianship and placing W.L. with David. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hetman v. Schwade, 317 S.W.3d 559 (Ark. 2009) (guardianship proceedings governed by statute)
- Graham v. Matheny, 846 S.W.3d 273 (Ark. 2009) (discussing statutory test and best‑interest requirement for child wards)
- In re Guardianship of S.H. (S.H. I), 409 S.W.3d 307 (Ark. 2012) (adopted two‑step burden‑shifting approach for fit parents who consented to guardianship)
- In re Guardianship of S.H. (S.H. II), 455 S.W.3d 313 (Ark. 2015) (held revocation meets "no longer necessary" and required guardians to rebut best interest by clear and convincing evidence)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (recognizes parents’ fundamental liberty interest and presumption that fit parents act in child’s best interest)
- Devine v. Martens, 263 S.W.3d 515 (Ark. 2007) (courts should recognize and encourage parental improvement in guardianship contexts)
- Slaton v. Slaton, 956 S.W.2d 150 (Ark. 1997) (Rule 60(a) ninety‑day limit on modifying judgments)
- Lloyd v. Butts, 37 S.W.3d 603 (Ark. 2001) (standard for parental fitness and courts’ reluctance to divest natural parents of custody)