Lindsey v. State
98 A.3d 340
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2014Background
- Victim Andrew Lindsey was shot during an attempted robbery; he incurred substantial medical bills and lost the ability to work as a barber.
- Shyquille Griffin pleaded guilty pursuant to a written proffer (ABA) plea agreement to attempted robbery with a split sentence (15 years, all but 18 months suspended); the agreement said nothing about restitution and stated it was the parties’ complete agreement.
- At Griffin’s sentencing hearing Lindsey (through a family representative) first requested restitution; the trial court denied restitution, concluding the plea agreement precluded it.
- Lindsey filed a timely Cr. P. § 11-103(e)(2) motion for reconsideration within 30 days arguing the court had misapplied the law; the court again denied relief, adding that imposing restitution post-sentence would illegally increase Griffin’s sentence.
- Lindsey sought leave to appeal; the Court of Special Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction to review the original sentencing denial (untimely appeal) but had jurisdiction to review the denial of the § 11-103(e)(2) motion and vacated that denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lindsey) | Defendant's Argument (Griffin/State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the plea agreement precluded ordering restitution | Lindsey: Victim has an independent presumptive statutory right to restitution; State cannot waive victim’s right and probation (and its conditions) was implicit in a split sentence | Griffin/State: Written plea was complete and omitted restitution; victim forfeited right by not seeking it before plea acceptance; court must honor the bargain | Held: Plea did not implicitly waive victim’s restitution right. Split sentence necessarily includes probation, and restitution is a common probation condition; court erred in concluding the plea barred restitution |
| Whether denial of § 11-103(e)(2) motion is appealable and timely | Lindsey: Motion for reconsideration timely; finality for restitution unresolved until motion period passes; appeal from denial of motion is proper | Griffin: Original judgment was final and appeal window lapsed; order denying reconsideration not appealable | Held: Court lacked jurisdiction to review the original sentencing denial (untimely) but had jurisdiction to review denial of the § 11-103(e)(2) motion because that motion protects the § 11-603 restitution right |
| Whether imposing restitution post-sentencing would unlawfully increase the sentence (Rule 4-345) | Lindsey: Statute authorizes a 30-day post-sentencing motion for restitution; probation conditions may be modified under Rule 4-346; defendant has no expectation of finality until statutory period expires | Griffin: Post-sentencing restitution is a punitive increase prohibited by Rule 4-345 and double jeopardy | Held: Because § 11-103(e)(2) authorizes reconsideration within 30 days, defendant lacked a legitimate expectation of finality as to restitution; ordering restitution then would not violate Rule 4-345 or double jeopardy; trial court abused discretion in denying the § 11-103(e)(2) motion |
| Remedy on remand | Lindsey: Court should receive evidence (medical bills), consider presumptive right to restitution, and enter judgment/condition of probation if appropriate | Griffin/State: N/A (argued against any post-sentence restitution) | Held: Vacated March 7, 2012 order denying reconsideration and remanded for proceedings consistent with opinion (court should consider evidence and the presumptive restitution right) |
Key Cases Cited
- Lafontant v. State, 197 Md. App. 217 (holding restitution may be imposed as a condition of probation even when not mentioned in plea agreement)
- Rankin v. State, 174 Md. App. 404 (split sentence implies probation; probationary conditions are included even if not expressly stated)
- Hoile v. State, 404 Md. 591 (sentence finality; courts may not increase a lawful sentence under Rule 4-345)
- Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460 (restitution imposed as condition of probation is part of criminal sentence)
- United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (a defendant may lack a legitimate expectation of finality in sentence where statute permits post-sentencing modification)