Lindsey Hoyt v. Lane Construction Corporati
927 F.3d 287
| 5th Cir. | 2019Background
- December 29, 2015: Jeffery Hoyt slid on an ice patch on FM 2264 (Wise County, TX), drove into adjacent water, and drowned; a second driver hit the same ice patch shortly after and survived.
- The Hoyt family sued C.E.N. Concrete Construction Co., Storm Water Management, Inc. (both Texas citizens), and Lane Construction Corporation (non‑Texas) in Texas state court alleging construction-related causes of the ice.
- State court granted summary judgment to C.E.N., entering a take‑nothing judgment. Plaintiffs later voluntarily dismissed Storm two days after the one‑year removal deadline and without consideration.
- Lane removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds; plaintiffs moved to remand arguing untimeliness and the voluntary‑involuntary rule. The district court denied remand and granted summary judgment for Lane; plaintiffs appealed.
- Fifth Circuit: affirmed denial of remand (finding bad faith joinder and improper joinder of C.E.N.), reversed summary judgment for Lane on statutory immunity and premises liability grounds and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of removal under 28 U.S.C. §1446(c)(1) (one‑year bar) | Hoyts: Lane's removal was untimely because made after one year | Lane: Plaintiffs acted in bad faith to prevent removal by keeping Storm in the case | Court: Denied remand — district court’s finding of plaintiffs’ bad faith not clearly erroneous; bad‑faith exception applies |
| Voluntary‑involuntary rule and C.E.N.'s status | Hoyts: Removal barred because diversity arose only after an involuntary (state court) dismissal of C.E.N. | Lane: C.E.N. was improperly joined / state court judgment was not appealable, so voluntary‑involuntary rule inapplicable | Court: C.E.N. was improperly joined (state court summary judgment unappealed), so voluntary‑involuntary rule does not block removal |
| Statutory immunity under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §97.002 (contractor immunity) | Hoyts: Lane failed to comply with TxDOT contract and TxDOT found Lane’s prior negligence; immunity does not apply | Lane: Performed under TxDOT contract and followed plans; entitled to immunity | Court: Reversed summary judgment — disputed facts (TxDOT findings, inspection failures, prior negligence) preclude immunity as a matter of law |
| Premises liability / gross negligence (natural condition and actual knowledge) | Hoyts: Ice formed due to Lane’s construction activity; Lane knew drainage/culvert issues and heavy freezing rain; jury could infer actual knowledge and gross negligence | Lane: Ice was a natural condition and lacked actual knowledge of hazardous ice | Court: Reversed summary judgment — evidence (isolated ice patch, expert opinion, TxDOT/Lane records, rain+freeze) creates material fact disputes on unnatural formation and actual knowledge; gross negligence remanded for reconsideration |
Key Cases Cited
- Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81 (requiring complete diversity)
- Spear Marketing, Inc. v. BancorpSouth Bank, 791 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for remand and bad‑faith findings)
- Tedford v. Warner‑Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003) (pre‑2011 equitable estoppel approach to one‑year removal bar)
- Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276 (1918) (voluntary‑involuntary rule)
- Smallwood v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2004) (improper/fraudulent joinder framework and Rule 12(b)(6)‑type analysis)
- Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 436 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2006) (improper joinder exception to voluntary‑involuntary rule when state court judgment unappealed)
- Scott & White Memorial Hosp. v. Fair, 310 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. 2010) (naturally occurring ice not actionable absent unnatural cause)
- City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 931 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1996) (actual knowledge may be inferred from other known facts)
- Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1992) (treatment of state court rulings in improper‑joinder analysis)
- Flagg v. Stryker Corp., 819 F.3d 132 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (clarifying improper‑joinder analysis and when to pierce pleadings)