750 F.3d 1061
9th Cir.2014Background
- Peta Lindsay, age 27, sought placement on the 2012 Peace and Freedom Party presidential primary ballot in California after filing nomination papers under Cal. Elec. Code § 6720.
- California Secretary of State Debra Bowen omitted Lindsay’s name from the certified list of generally recognized candidates because Lindsay admitted she was constitutionally ineligible due to age (U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5).
- Lindsay sued under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Twentieth Amendment; the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
- The Ninth Circuit found the controversy capable of repetition yet evading review and considered the federal constitutional claims on appeal.
- The court evaluated whether excluding an indisputably ineligible candidate from the ballot unconstitutionally burdened speech/association, violated equal protection by disparate treatment, or was precluded by the Twentieth Amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| First Amendment — ballot access/speech and association | Lindsay: exclusion burdened her and the party's speech/associational rights and denied the party ability to present an alternative | Bowen: exclusion is a neutral, minimal restriction tied to state interest in election integrity and avoiding voter confusion | Held: Burden minimal and justified; exclusion permissible because Lindsay was indisputably ineligible |
| Authority under state law to place her name | Lindsay: §6720 entitles her to placement as generally recognized candidate | Bowen: state-law placement claim is for state court and unrelated to federal constitutional claims | Held: State-law claim not resolved here; federal claim fails regardless |
| Equal Protection — disparate treatment | Lindsay: she was similarly situated to other Peace & Freedom candidates who were listed | Bowen: ineligible candidates are different in fact; treating indisputably ineligible candidates differently is rationally related to election integrity | Held: No equal protection violation; distinguishing ineligible vs. colorable-eligibility candidates is rationally related to legitimate state interests |
| Twentieth Amendment — preemption of state determinations of candidate qualifications | Lindsay: Twentieth Amendment restricts states from determining presidential candidate qualifications | Bowen: Amendment merely provides contingency rules for post-election vacancies; it does not bar states from excluding known ineligible candidates | Held: Even assuming a private right, the Twentieth Amendment does not prohibit states from excluding known ineligible presidential candidates |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (balancing test for ballot access burdens on speech and association)
- Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (state interest in ballot integrity can justify restrictions imposing lesser burdens)
- Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (neutral candidacy qualifications like age are permissible)
- Rubin v. City of Santa Monica, 308 F.3d 1008 (even-handed, politically neutral restrictions are not severe burdens)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (framework for assessing burdens on voting rights)
- Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (states may protect political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard for plausibly alleging discriminatory intent)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading requirements)
- Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (law need not treat different facts as the same)
- Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (distinct treatment of different candidate statuses permissible)
- Ventura Mobilehome Cmtys. Owners Ass'n v. City of San Buenaventura, 371 F.3d 1046 (rational-basis review for differing treatment related to local interests)
Result: Affirmed.