Lindsay A., Andrew W. v. Dcs, 1 CA-JV 17-0122

Mother (Lindsay A.) and Father (Andrew W.) are parents of six minor children; DCS sought and the juvenile court previously found the children dependent.
DCS filed motions to terminate both parents’ rights in 2016–2017.
Court repeatedly warned parents they must attend termination hearings; initial telephonic participation was excused for good cause at an earlier hearing.
At a scheduled pretrial conference, the parents appeared telephonically without court permission; the court found no good cause for their absence, deemed their appearance waived, converted the pretrial into a termination adjudication, and limited their participation.
DCS presented testimony (caseworker); parents’ counsel cross-examined but proffered no evidence; the court terminated parental rights.
The parents appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by applying waiver and denying a fair adjudication.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a parent’s unauthorized telephonic appearance at a pretrial conference can be treated as a failure to appear and justify waiver of rights and conversion to a termination adjudication	Parents: telephonic participation (even if unauthorized) at a case-management pretrial does not amount to a forfeiture of rights; waiver is inappropriate where absence did not impede the conference’s organizational purposes	DCS/Court: parents failed to appear in person as required; court may find waiver for failure to appear and proceed to adjudication	Reversed: court abused its discretion; unauthorized telephonic participation at a purely organizational pretrial did not justify deeming parents to have waived rights and admitting allegations
Whether application of waiver must be constrained by due process and the nature of the hearing (organizational vs. evidentiary)	Parents: due process requires that waiver not be rigidly applied; at pretrial (non-evidentiary) telephonic presence would not hinder case progression and should not bar participation at adjudication	DCS/Court: waiver promotes attendance and avoids delay; court has discretion to assess good cause and impose sanctions including waiver	Reversed: waiver must be applied in view of its purpose and due process; overly rigid application is an abuse of discretion, especially where the hearing’s organizational nature meant telephonic presence posed no threat to timely resolution

Brenda D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 242 Ariz. 150 (App. 2017) (overly rigid waiver for failure to appear can violate due process; tardiness or late appearance may preclude waiver)
Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279 (2005) (parental termination requires fundamentally fair procedures)
Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205 (App. 2008) (waiver rule limits parent’s participation but does not relieve movant of burden to prove grounds for termination)
Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 299 (App. 2007) (discussing scope and effect of waiver in juvenile termination proceedings)
Willie G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 231 (App. 2005) (recognizes court discretion under rule permitting or denying telephonic participation in certain juvenile proceedings)
Estate of Lewis v. Lewis, 229 Ariz. 316 (App. 2012) (extreme limits on imposing case-dispositive sanctions for nonappearance at pretrial under civil rules)
State v. Moore, 203 Ariz. 515 (App. 2002) (telephonic testimony can impede assessment of witness demeanor; distinction between evidentiary and organizational hearings)