Lindley v. Federal Deposit Insurance, 733 F.3d 1043

This is a consolidated appeal of six district court orders in which the FDIC, as receiver for Darby Bank, removed state-law actions to federal court and sought summary judgment on federal defenses.
Tenants, who leased or purchased space in the Drayton Tower, asserted fraud and negligent misrepresentation against Darby Bank and against Drayprop Defendants for renovation promises and related breach claims.
Darby Bank failed; the FDIC was substituted as receiver in place of Darby Bank in all Tenants’ lawsuits and removals occurred under 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B).
The district court denied remand, granted summary judgment to the FDIC based on D’Oench, Duhme and § 1823(e), and dismissed pendent state-law claims against non-FDIC defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The Tenants appeal the denial of remand and the summary-judgment ruling; the Drayprop Defendants cross-appeal arguing continued jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims after FDIC’s dismissal.
The panel ultimately holds that remand was improper, summary judgment for the FDIC was proper, but the district court erred in dismissing remaining claims against non-FDIC defendants because § 1819(b)(2)(A) creates original jurisdiction over pendent claims at the time the FDIC is a party and this jurisdiction survives the FDIC’s later dismissal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court properly denied remand	Tenants: FDIC defenses provide federal question jurisdiction that overcomes state-law remand.	FDIC: removal is proper under FIRREA § 1819(b)(2)(A)/(B) and the state-law exception is inapt.	Remand denial affirmed
Whether summary judgment for the FDIC was appropriate under D’Oench and § 1823(e)	Tenants: Hill Letter creates genuine issues; damages not necessarily tied to regular banking records.	FDIC: Hill Letter fails prongs of § 1823(e) and is not a record; D’Oench bars claims.	Summary judgment for FDIC affirmed
Whether the district court properly dismissed pendent state-law claims against non-FDIC defendants after FDIC dismissal	Drayprop Defendants: § 1819(b)(2)(A) gave original jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims that survive FDIC dismissal.	FDIC: jurisdiction over pendent claims dissipates after FDIC is dismissed; district court should decline jurisdiction.	District court erred; § 1819(b)(2)(A) creates original jurisdiction over pendent claims at time of removal and persists after FDIC dismissal

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1987) (removal and federal-question/subject-matter jurisdiction basics)
Castleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773 (11th Cir. 2005) (special FDIC removal provisions; rebuttable presumption of federal jurisdiction)
Lazuka v. FDIC, 931 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1991) (rebuttable presumption of federal jurisdiction under § 1819(b)(2)(A))
In re Geri Zahn, Inc., 25 F.3d 1539 (11th Cir. 1994) (free-standing torts vs. D'Oench; relatedness to banking records)
OPS Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 306 (11th Cir. 1993) (regular banking transactions and D’Oench implications)
Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Se. Bank N.A., 83 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1996) (core D’Oench doctrine principles for banking transactions)
Vernon I, 907 F.2d 1101 (11th Cir. 1990) (free-standing torts not barred when records not tied to ordinary banking transactions)
Vernon II, 981 F.2d 1230 (11th Cir. 1993) (extension of Vernon I; distinguishes between torts tied to banking records)
Four Star Holding Co., 178 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 1999) (jurisdictional treatment under FIRREA § 1441l/1819 related issues)
New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492 (3d Cir. 1996) (time-of-filing rule and FIRREA jurisdiction)