Linda Salas Pollok v. Marcel Andrew Pollok
04-16-00029-CV
| Tex. App. | Sep 28, 2016Background
- Linda and Marcel Pollok divorced in 1993; the decree awarded Linda “one-half of Respondent’s Profit Sharing Plan at the time of retirement or after having left the employment of Dixie Iron Works.”
- Marcel worked at Dixie Iron Works and participated in a profit‑sharing retirement plan during the marriage (married 1988, divorced 1993).
- In 2012 Linda filed to enforce the decree, seeking production of plan information and clarification of the decree; litigation followed including a default judgment later set aside and an amended petition.
- The parties stipulated to forgo an evidentiary hearing and agreed the signed order would be supported for appellate purposes.
- The trial court issued an enforcement and clarification order finding the decree ambiguous and awarding Linda one‑half only of benefits accrued between the marriage (June 4, 1988) and the divorce (March 10, 1993); the court also awarded Marcel $3,000 in attorney’s fees.
- Linda appealed, arguing the decree unambiguously awarded one‑half of Marcel’s total retirement benefits and challenging the attorney’s fees award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Linda) | Defendant's Argument (Marcel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the divorce decree unambiguously awards one‑half of Marcel’s total retirement benefits or is ambiguous such that Linda gets only one‑half of benefits accrued during the marriage | Decree is unambiguous: Linda entitled to one‑half of Marcel’s total retirement benefits, determined at retirement or when he leaves employment | Decree is ambiguous; absent the word “total” it may reasonably be read to limit Linda to benefits accrued during the marriage; Linda previously anticipated ambiguity | Court held the decree is unambiguous and awards Linda one‑half of Marcel’s total retirement benefits; trial court erred in construing it to one‑half of benefits accrued during marriage |
| Whether the attorney’s fees award in favor of Marcel was supported by legally sufficient evidence | Testimony was conclusory and insufficient to support fees | Parties stipulated order would be supported; trial court may take judicial notice of customary fees and the file; testimony from default hearing carried with case | Court affirmed the attorney’s fees award, finding Linda estopped by stipulation and the fees legally supported (judicial notice and prior testimony) |
Key Cases Cited
- Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2003) (language awarding a pro rata interest in pension is unambiguous and must be given literal effect)
- Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439 (Tex. 2003) (similar decree language awards one‑half of total pension benefits)
- Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. 2009) (divorce decrees interpreted using general rules for construction of judgments; decide ambiguity as a question of law)
- Douglas v. Douglas, 454 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014) (standard of review for post‑divorce clarification/enforcement is abuse of discretion)
- Lefton v. Griffith, 136 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004) (trial court may take judicial notice of usual and customary attorney’s fees and file contents in default‑related proceedings)