Linda Prentice, etc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 338 So.3d 831

Background

John C. Price smoked heavily, developed COPD, and died; Linda Prentice (personal representative) pursued wrongful-death claims against R.J. Reynolds (RJR) for strict liability, negligence, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy to conceal.
The litigation is an Engle-progeny case: certain Phase I findings from Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (regarding tobacco defendants’ concealment/omissions about health/addictiveness) are given res judicata effect for individual suits.
A jury found Price was an Engle class member and returned verdicts for Prentice on strict liability, negligence, and concealment conspiracy (but not fraudulent concealment), awarding $6.4 million and allocating fault 60% to Price / 40% to RJR; the concealment conspiracy verdict barred reduction for comparative fault.
RJR appealed, challenging the trial court’s reliance instruction for the concealment conspiracy claim; the First DCA vacated the judgment based on Whitmire (holding Engle-progeny plaintiffs must prove detrimental reliance on fraudulent statements).
Other district courts (Second, Third, Fourth) had held Engle plaintiffs may prove reliance by inference from pervasive industry advertising and need not identify a specific statement, creating a conflict.
The Florida Supreme Court resolved the conflict: it held an Engle-progeny plaintiff must prove reliance on a statement (which may be a category of statements) made by an Engle defendant or co-conspirator that concealed or omitted material information about smoking’s health effects or addictiveness; the trial court’s instruction that permitted "reliance on omission/conspiracy" was erroneous.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Prentice)	Defendant's Argument (RJR)	Held
Whether an Engle-progeny plaintiff must prove reliance on a statement (vs. reliance on silence/omission)	Reliance may be inferred from pervasive industry conduct and silence; plaintiff need not point to a statement.	Plaintiff must prove reliance on a statement that induced the plaintiff’s false belief.	Held: Plaintiff must prove reliance on a statement by an Engle defendant/co-conspirator that concealed or omitted material information about health/addictiveness.
Whether "a statement" requires a specific utterance or may be proven by category/campaign and inference	Reliance can be shown by inference from industry-wide advertising/campaigns and plaintiff’s smoking history.	Reliance need not be tied to a single ad; a category of statements or campaign can suffice if they caused the plaintiff’s beliefs.	Held: Reliance need not be a single specific statement; a plaintiff may rely on a category or campaign of statements so long as there is proof connecting those statements to the plaintiff’s beliefs and injury.
Whether the trial court instruction ("reliance on conspiracy/omission") was proper	Instruction allowed jury to find causation from concealment and pervasive conduct; inference was appropriate.	Instruction was legally deficient because it did not require reliance on a statement.	Held: Instruction was erroneous and prejudicial; instruction must require proof of reliance on statements, not mere nondisclosure or reliance on a conspiracy.

Key Cases Cited

Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (Phase I findings on defendants’ concealment given res judicata effect in progeny suits)
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 2013) (clarifying use of approved Phase I findings in Engle-progeny cases)
Hess v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 175 So. 3d 687 (Fla. 2015) (stating Engle-progeny plaintiffs must prove detrimental reliance for concealment claims)
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Whitmire, 260 So. 3d 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (held Engle-progeny plaintiffs must prove reliance on fraudulent statements)
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Prentice, 290 So. 3d 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (first-DCA decision under review addressing the disputed jury instruction)
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Duignan, 243 So. 3d 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (held plaintiff need not identify a specific statement; reliance may be inferred)
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Burgess, 294 So. 3d 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (affirmed inference of reliance from pervasive advertising)
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Chadwell, 306 So. 3d 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (rejected Whitmire to the extent it required proof of reliance on a specific statement)
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Martin, 53 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (earlier First DCA decision recognizing reliance can be inferred from pervasive misleading advertising)
Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 232 So. 3d 294 (Fla. 2017) (discussing effect of intentional torts on comparative fault reductions)