Linda Moroney v. St. John Missionary Baptist Church, Inc., AKA St. John Missionary Baptist Church, as Successor and Assignee of St. John Colored Baptist Church
14-20-00203-CV
| Tex. App. | Nov 4, 2021Background:
- In 1935 George Dew conveyed surface rights in a 2‑acre tract to St. John Colored Baptist Church "for use only as a church premises and for religious purposes," with a condition that if the premises were not used or were abandoned they "are to revert to the grantor."
- Dew died a few weeks after executing the deed; appellant Linda Moroney is one of Dew’s heirs; appellee Church is the grantee/successor and has continuously used the property for religious purposes.
- The Church sued Dew’s heirs to quiet title and sought a declaration that Dew’s reversionary interest terminated at his death; Moroney counterclaimed asserting a reversionary (right of entry) interest.
- The trial court found the deed created a right of entry but held that right terminated upon Dew’s death (i.e., did not pass to heirs), alternatively ruling limitations or lapse barred any right, and awarded attorney’s fees to the Church.
- The court of appeals reviewed deed construction de novo, concluded Dew retained a right of entry that did not end at his death and that no limitations/laches barred enforcement (because the condition never was breached), and reversed the declaratory judgment and fee award.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Church) | Defendant's Argument (Moroney) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nature of Dew’s retained interest: possibility of reverter vs. right of entry | Language like "revert" and "so long as" creates a possibility of reverter (or otherwise that reversion does not require entry) | The deed creates a right of entry (condition subsequent/power of termination) or at least is ambiguous | Court: The deed creates a right of entry (condition subsequent) — doubts resolved in favor of right of entry |
| Whether Dew’s right terminated at his death because deed omitted "and his heirs" | The omission shows the grantor intended the right to be personal and to end with Dew | Heirs can inherit and enforce a right of entry; no special words of inheritance required under Texas law | Court: The right of entry did not terminate at Dew’s death; it passes to his heirs |
| Whether limitations, laches, or waiver extinguish the right | The Church argued rights lapsed or were barred by limitations/long delay | Moroney: No breach occurred, so no accrual of limitations or laches; right never became exercisable | Court: No evidence of breach; limitations/laches do not apply because the condition has not been violated |
| Availability of attorney’s fees to the Church | Church claimed fees under the Declaratory Judgments Act for construction/validity of deed | Moroney: The suit is essentially to quiet title (remove a cloud) and fees under the Act are not available for quiet‑title actions | Court: Award of fees reversed; action treated as quiet title so fees under the Act are unavailable |
Key Cases Cited
- Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017) (construction of unambiguous deed is question of law)
- LaLonde v. Gosnell, 593 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2019) (de novo review where no fact issues exist)
- Lawyers Trust Co. v. City of Houston, 359 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1962) (resolve doubt in favor of condition subsequent/right of entry)
- El Dorado Land Co. v. City of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. 2013) (both possibility of reverter and right of entry are future devisable interests)
- Stevens v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. Co., 212 S.W. 639 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1919) (reversionary interest enforceable by grantor and those "connected with him in blood")
- Daggett v. City of Fort Worth, 177 S.W. 222 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1915) (early authority suggesting heirs cannot re-enter when not named — treated as anomalous/dicta)
- Kachina Pipeline Co. v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2015) (equitable basis for attorney’s fees reversed when underlying declaratory relief reversed)