Linda McCarthy v. Broward College and Sunshine Cleaning Systems, Inc.
164 So. 3d 78
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Linda McCarthy slipped and fell on an unidentified liquid in an elevator at Broward College’s Coconut Creek campus on August 25, 2011 and sued Broward College for negligence.
- Broward College moved for summary judgment under Fla. Stat. § 768.0755 (2011), arguing plaintiff could not prove actual or constructive notice of the transitory dangerous condition.
- Trial court granted summary judgment, finding Broward College qualified as a “business establishment” under § 768.0755 and there was no genuine issue of material fact about notice.
- McCarthy appealed, arguing: (1) the statute does not apply to state colleges; (2) genuine factual disputes remain about notice and causation; and (3) the College breached a common-law duty of care.
- The Fourth District affirmed, holding the statute applies to public colleges and that summary judgment was proper because plaintiff provided no evidence of how long the liquid was present, its source, or any employee knowledge or regularity of the condition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 768.0755’s term "business establishment" includes a state college | McCarthy: Broward College is not a "business establishment" because it is state-owned higher education | Broward College: the statute’s plain meaning covers locations where services are rendered for a fee, including colleges | Court: Yes; a college is a "business establishment" under the statute |
| Whether McCarthy proved actual or constructive notice of the liquid | McCarthy: Evidence (rain earlier, oily/wet stain on clothing) permits inference College had notice | Broward College: No evidence identifying the substance, its source, duration, or employee knowledge; no regularity shown | Court: No genuine issue; plaintiff failed to prove actual or constructive notice |
| Whether summary judgment was improper because factual inferences should go to the jury | McCarthy: Multiple inferences could be drawn in her favor (e.g., rain tracked into elevator) | Broward College: Ruling consistent with precedent—plaintiff’s case requires stacking inferences and lacks particularized evidence | Court: Summary judgment appropriate; granting would not impermissibly stack inferences |
| Whether common-law duty of care survives the statute and provides an alternative basis for liability | McCarthy: Common-law negligence claim survives and may support recovery | Broward College: Plaintiff produced no facts to establish breach or notice under common law either | Court: Section does not displace common law but plaintiff offered insufficient factual proof under either standard; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984) (unambiguous statutory language must be given its plain meaning)
- Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Santos, 118 So. 3d 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (definition of "business establishment" as location where services are rendered)
- Kenz v. Miami-Dade County, 116 So. 3d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (applying § 768.0755 to government-owned service facilities)
- Delgado v. Laundromax, Inc., 65 So. 3d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff could not identify source, duration, or notice of spill)
- Schmidt v. Bowl America Florida, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (inspection gaps may permit inference of notice in some circumstances)
- Lynch v. Target Stores, Div. of Dayton Hudson Corp., 790 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (no-inspection period evidence can create triable issue on constructive notice)
- Jelic v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 150 So. 3d 1223 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (summary judgment standard reaffirmed)