Linda Ferreira v. Douglas W. Butler and Debra L. Butler
575 S.W.3d 331
Tex.2019Background
- Patricia Hill died in 2006 and her will left her entire estate to her husband Norman; Norman never probated Patricia’s will and died in 2015.
- Norman’s widow Linda (petitioner) discovered Patricia’s will among Norman’s effects and, as Norman’s executor, offered Patricia’s will for probate in 2015 (nine years after Patricia’s death) as a muniment of title.
- Patricia’s children, Douglas and Debra Butler (respondents), contested probate under Texas Estates Code §256.003(a), which bars probate more than four years after the testator’s death unless the applicant was not in default in presenting the will.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the Butlers; the court of appeals affirmed, holding Norman’s default in failing to probate Patricia’s will imputed to Linda (even if she sued in her individual capacity) based on Faris v. Faris.
- The Texas Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether (1) Linda, as Norman’s executor, is the applicant and therefore bound by Norman’s default, and (2) whether a devisee’s default can be imputed to her own devisee.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ferreira) | Defendant's Argument (Butler) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who is the applicant under §256.003(a)? | Linda: she is an applicant in her capacity as executor and also could be an interested person as Norman’s devisee if pleaded. | Butlers: Linda’s pleadings make her the executor-applicant and she stands in Norman’s shoes. | As executor, Linda stands in Norman’s shoes; Norman’s default bars probate in that capacity. |
| If Linda sued in her individual capacity as Norman’s devisee, is Norman’s default relevant? | Linda: no; statute asks whether the applicant was in default, so only the applicant’s conduct matters. | Butlers: follow Faris — a devisee’s default is imputed to her devisees; Norman’s default should bar Linda. | The Court overruled Faris: if Linda applies in her individual capacity, only her own default is relevant. |
| Does the court reach equities or testator intent to allow late probate? | Linda: equities favor allowing probate; Butlers delayed and didn’t administer estate. | Butlers: allowing late probate frustrates intestacy rights and is unjust. | Court rejected equitable/testator-intent balancing standard (adopted by one court of appeals); statute’s plain text controls. |
| Procedural remedy given conflicting pleadings and precedent? | Linda: should be allowed to amend pleadings to proceed in individual capacity. | Butlers: uphold dismissal under existing pleadings and Faris. | Court vacated lower judgments, overruled Faris, and remanded so Linda may amend to plead individual-capacity application. |
Key Cases Cited
- Faris v. Faris, 138 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1940) (earlier rule imputing a devisee’s default to her devisees; overruled)
- Matt v. Ward, 255 S.W. 794 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1923) (precedent cited in earlier imputation decisions)
- St. Mary’s Orphan Asylum of Texas v. Masterson, 122 S.W. 587 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1909) (interpreting statute to judge applicant by applicant’s own conduct)
- In re Estate of Campbell, 343 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011) (adopted an equities/testator-intent balancing test; explicitly rejected)
- Logan v. Thomason, 202 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1947) (standing/pecuniary-interest framing for interested persons)