Linda E. Walsh v. Richard J. Walsh, Warrenn C. Anderson
A16-405
Minn. Ct. App.Dec 27, 2016Background
- Linda Walsh, after initiating and later dismissing a divorce, signed conflict waivers and retained (and later was represented by) the law firm FAMB, which prepared trusts and an LLC that placed farm property outside the marital estate.
- Walsh sued Richard Walsh, their son, FAMB, and attorney Warrenn Anderson alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty based on the creation of irrevocable trusts and related transactions.
- Walsh produced an expert-review affidavit and a December 1, 2012 expert report describing duty and breach in detail but offering only two brief, conclusory statements on causation; the report was later incorporated into signed interrogatory answers.
- Respondents moved to dismiss under Minn. Stat. § 544.42 for inadequate expert disclosure; the district court initially denied dismissal but granted reconsideration after the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Guzick v. Kimball.
- On reconsideration the district court concluded the expert report failed to provide meaningful causation analysis required to qualify for the statute’s safe-harbor and dismissed Walsh’s malpractice and breach claims with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Walsh satisfied Minn. Stat. § 544.42 expert-disclosure requirements for malpractice claims | Walsh argued her expert report, answers to interrogatories, and earlier affidavit provided sufficient expert opinion on duty, breach, causation, and damages | Respondents argued the expert disclosure lacked a meaningful summary of the expert’s opinion on causation and thus failed § 544.42 | Court held the disclosure was adequate on duty and breach but insufficient on causation and therefore dismissal was proper under § 544.42 as construed in Guzick |
| Whether the report qualified for the 60-day safe-harbor to cure deficiencies | Walsh argued the report provided meaningful information beyond conclusory statements and thus should get safe-harbor cure opportunity | Respondents argued the report only implied causation and did not meet the narrow safe-harbor threshold | Held that Guzick/Brown-Wilbert require explicit causation analysis; report did not qualify for safe-harbor |
| Whether causation required expert testimony in this case | Walsh conceded proximate causation required expert testimony given the complexity of trust transactions | Respondents agreed expert testimony was required and that disclosure was deficient on that element | Court applied de novo review to the legal question and concluded expert proof of causation was required and the disclosure failed to summarize the expert’s causation opinion |
| Whether the district court erred by changing its ruling on reconsideration after Guzick | Walsh argued the court improperly altered its earlier denial of dismissal | Respondents argued reconsideration was appropriate in light of new controlling precedent (Guzick) | Court held reconsideration was proper; change in law justified revisiting the earlier ruling |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209 (Minn. 2007) (expert-disclosure statute requires meaningful summary beyond conclusory statements to trigger safe-harbor)
- Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 2015) (reaffirmed narrow safe-harbor standard; affidavit must explicitly explain expert’s opinion on causation and each malpractice element requiring expert proof)
- Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 252 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1977) (lay jurors need not rely on expert testimony when they can evaluate attorney conduct themselves)
- State v. Ward, 580 N.W.2d 67 (Minn. App. 1998) (appellate court will not overturn established supreme court precedent)
