Linda Ann Parrish Richardson and Gary Bruce Richardson, Co-Trustees of the M.C. Parrish, Jr. Testamentary Trust v. Donald Roger Mills
12-15-00170-CV
| Tex. App. | Nov 16, 2015Background
- The dispute concerns title to an undivided one-half mineral interest under a 160-acre tract conveyed by a July 9, 1906 instrument (the “1906 Deed”) from various Mills family members to Robt. Lindsey and June C. Harris.
- Lindsey and Harris executed a January 18, 1908 instrument (the “1908 Release”) that on its face recites it releases a lease or contract dated July 9, 1907 (described as a lease to “Nacogdoches Land Company”); the Release was recorded years later.
- Appellants (Parrish Trust parties and Lummis parties) claim the 1906 Deed conveyed a present fee (an undivided one-half mineral interest) and that the 1908 Release does not reconvey or extinguish that deeded interest.
- Appellees (Donald Roger Mills and Beverly Mills Pool) contend the 1906 instrument was an executory contract/lease or otherwise expired/reverted and that the 1908 Release released the interest; they sought quiet-title and recovery of royalties.
- Bench trial resulted in final judgment for Appellees: the court concluded the 1908 Release operated to extinguish the interest described in the 1906 instrument and quieted title in Appellees; Appellants appeal arguing errors of law and evidentiary rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mills) | Defendant's Argument (Parrish/Lummis) | Held (trial court) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper legal characterization of the 1906 instrument (deed vs. executory contract/lease) | The 1906 instrument was not an outright fee deed; it embodied executory promises and functioned as a contract/lease or a limited-term instrument | The 1906 instrument is an unambiguous present conveyance (fee deed) of an undivided one-half mineral interest; its language (granting, habendum, warranty) shows present transfer | Court concluded the 1908 Release released the instrument described as the 1906 contract and treated the 1906 instrument as released (effectively accepting Mills’ construction) |
| Admissibility of parol/extrinsic evidence to construe 1906 Deed and 1908 Release | Extrinsic evidence (historical documents, expert legal opinion) shows the parties intended a limited/contractual interest and that the Release applied to that instrument | The instruments are unambiguous; parol evidence is not admissible to vary the clear four‑corners meaning | Court admitted extrinsic evidence and relied on it in construing the Release and prior instrument as released |
| Whether trial court findings are factual vs. legal (treatment on appeal) | Findings reflect mixed questions but support Mills; many findings were proper factual findings | Appellants argue many findings are actually conclusions of law (thus reviewable de novo) and some lack evidentiary support | Trial court entered findings/conclusions that supported judgment for Mills; Appellants contend many are legal conclusions and not binding |
| Limitations/estoppel/adverse possession/impact of 1908 Release | Plaintiffs say their claim accrued when they discovered the claimed cloud (2011) and the Release extinguished the earlier interest; limitations and laches do not bar relief | Defendants assert the 1906 deed was an executed conveyance long ago, so any attack based on failure of consideration or nonperformance is time-barred and estopped by prior recorded instruments (e.g., 1967 deed of trust recitals) | Court found Plaintiffs’ suit not time-barred and concluded the Release (1908) released the prior contract/instrument, so defenses of limitations/laches did not bar relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Luckel v. White, 810 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991) (four‑corners rule and primary duty to ascertain parties’ intent from instrument language)
- Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. 2002) (in construing unambiguous lease/deed, examine the entire instrument and harmonize provisions)
- Crumpton v. Scott, 250 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. Fort Worth 1952) (deed on its face meeting formalities conveys present title even if consideration included future services; failure of performance does not automatically void an executed deed)
- Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. 2003) (oil & gas lease characterized as fee simple determinable; distinction between lease interest and mineral fee)
- Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982) (an unrecorded instrument described in a recorded instrument constitutes notice)
- Danciger Oil & Refining Co. of Texas v. Powell, 154 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1941) (cases addressing effect of mineral‑development language and distinction between deeds and leases)