334 So.3d 1162
Miss. Ct. App.2021Background
- On Feb. 18, 2014 Lincoln Dille (appellant) shot and killed Kanisky Lacey at a gas station; surveillance video shows Dille exit the passenger side with a gun and shoot Lacey eight times at close range; no gun was found on Lacey.
- Dille had previously obtained a peace bond against Lacey and had purchased a gun because he feared Lacey; Rosemary Johnson (girlfriend) and Dille were meeting Lacey to exchange custody of a child when the shooting occurred.
- Johnson heard Lacey’s post‑shooting words, “Why did you shoot me,” which the trial court admitted as a dying declaration; Dille claimed self‑defense at trial.
- The first trial (June 2018) ended in a mistrial; on retrial (April 2019) the jury convicted Dille of first‑degree (deliberate‑design) murder but acquitted him on shooting into an occupied vehicle; he received life imprisonment.
- On appeal the public defender and Dille (pro se) raised multiple issues including admissibility of the dying declaration, limits on impeachment of an officer, denial of a mistrial for witness intimidation, the court’s handling of a jury question, Batson challenges, admissibility of surrogate medical testimony, speedy‑trial delay, and sufficiency/self‑defense.
Issues
| Issue | Dille’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Lacey’s dying declaration (“Why did you shoot me”) | Statement was hearsay and irrelevant to Dille’s state of mind; should be excluded | It was admissible as a dying declaration and relevant because Dille asserted self‑defense (puts victim’s state of mind at issue) | Admitted; appellate court affirmed—statement met dying‑declaration criteria and was relevant to self‑defense claim |
| Limiting cross‑examination of Officer Lampley about his administrative leave | Court prevented full proffer and confrontation by cutting off inquiry into the allegation that prompted leave | Allegations were unsubstantiated, ongoing, irrelevant to testimony corroborated by video; proffer was allowed but limited | No abuse of discretion; exclusion of unsubstantiated administrative allegation proper and proffer adequate |
| Motion for mistrial after victim’s sister confronted witness Johnson during recess | Encounter intimidated Johnson and prejudiced defense; mistrial required | Court thoroughly questioned Johnson; she said testimony unchanged; no irreparable prejudice | Denied; no abuse of discretion—no substantial and irreparable prejudice shown |
| Court’s handling of jury question during deliberations (judge replied without notifying parties) | Judge violated Rule 23.3 and Dille’s right to be present; response without parties prejudicial | Court’s response was non‑substantive (told jury to follow existing instructions); harmless error | Error to exclude parties from response but harmless because no substantive supplemental instruction; affirmed |
| Exclusion of testimony about prior assault by victim on Johnson’s ex (Arcola) | Testimony was crucial character evidence to show victim’s violent propensity and support self‑defense | Evidence was remote/hearsay, Dille lacked firsthand knowledge; other evidence of threats was admitted | No reversible error; jury had sufficient evidence of prior threats via other witnesses; exclusion not prejudicial |
| Batson challenge to State’s peremptory strikes of Black jurors | Pattern of striking all Black veniremen showed discrimination; proffered reasons were pretextual | State offered race‑neutral reasons (demeanor, prior gun experience, unresponsiveness) | Court’s credibility findings sustained; no clear error—race‑neutral reasons accepted |
| Admission of surrogate medical examiner (Dr. LeVaughn) who did not perform autopsy | Sixth Amendment confrontation violation because autopsy physician was available out‑of‑state | Testifying expert reviewed autopsy, photos and signed report under QA protocols; surrogate testimony permitted | No error; surrogate expert who reviewed file may testify under precedent |
| Speedy‑trial claim (fourth amendment/constitutional) | 1,574‑day delay between arrest and first trial violated right to speedy trial; prejudice to defense | Delay partly explained by continuances and defense requests; defendant asserted right early; no showing of prejudice impairing defense | Though delay was long, Barker factors do not show prejudice; no plain error—claim denied |
| Suppression/admission of toxicology report | Trial court erroneously suppressed toxicology evidence | No ruling in second trial and issue not raised post‑trial; waived | Procedurally barred on appeal; no preserved error |
| Prosecutorial closing argument (“do the right thing”) | Argument was improper send‑a‑message, inflammatory | Statements urged jurors to be rational and follow law—not to inflame | Not misconduct; comments were permissible and not so inflammatory to require reversal |
| Sufficiency of evidence and self‑defense | Evidence allegedly supports justifiable homicide; State failed to prove deliberate design beyond reasonable doubt | Surveillance video, witness testimony, and circumstances support deliberate design and that Dille was aggressor | Evidence sufficient to support first‑degree murder; jury could reject self‑defense |
| Ineffective assistance for failure to call Detective Luckett | Counsel omitted a potentially exculpatory witness | Record inadequate to resolve IAC on direct appeal; issue for post‑conviction relief | No ruling on merits; claim reserved for collateral review if record expanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Watts v. State, 492 So. 2d 1281 (Miss. 1986) (establishes dying‑declaration test)
- Nichols v. State, 965 So. 2d 770 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (definition of dying declaration)
- Trotter v. State, 9 So. 3d 402 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (application of dying‑declaration criteria)
- Jones v. State, 306 So. 2d 57 (Miss. 1975) (need for full on‑the‑record proffer)
- Kidd v. State, 258 So. 2d 423 (Miss. 1972) (error to deny proffered cross‑examination)
- Ellis v. State, 856 So. 2d 561 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (limits on impeachment with unsubstantiated allegations)
- Johnson v. State, 198 So. 3d 427 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (exclusion of officer bribery allegations upheld where irrelevant/unsubstantiated)
- Hartzog v. State, 240 So. 3d 462 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (procedure for supplemental jury instructions after a question)
- Fairley v. State, 251 So. 3d 761 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (surrogate medical examiner may testify after reviewing file)
- McGowen v. State, 859 So. 2d 320 (Miss. 2003) (expert who reviews analysis may testify consistent with Confrontation Clause jurisprudence)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (four‑factor speedy‑trial balancing test)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (prohibits race‑based peremptory strikes)
- Manning v. State, 765 So. 2d 516 (Miss. 2000) (indicia of pretext in Batson analysis)
- Hughes v. State, 983 So. 2d 270 (Miss. 2008) (standard for giving supplemental jury instructions)