Limpin v. United States, 3:25-cv-02162

Melchor Karl T. Limpin, proceeding pro se, filed a civil action against the United States and related entities after a prior qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) was dismissed.
Plaintiff’s previous qui tam suit was dismissed because he, as a non-attorney, could not prosecute the suit pro se on behalf of the United States; this decision was based on established circuit precedent.
Plaintiff subsequently filed the current action, alleging due process violations and abuse of process by the United States for declining to intervene in his previous case and for asserting that he could not proceed pro se.
Plaintiff also sought to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) but did not submit the required supporting affidavit.
The district court screened the complaint for sufficiency under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), determining whether it stated a claim or was frivolous.
The court found the complaint failed to state any valid claim and that the defects could not be cured by amendment, thus dismissing it without leave to amend.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Can Plaintiff proceed IFP without a proper affidavit?	Claims to have attached affidavit or it was inadvertently missing	Plaintiff did not submit required affidavit	Denied IFP motion due to lack of requisite affidavit
Due process violation by U.S. for declining intervention	U.S. deprived Limpin of opportunity and possible reward	U.S. not obligated to intervene by statute	No constitutional or procedural deprivation; claim dismissed
Pro se prosecution of qui tam action	Limpin argues right to proceed pro se	Precedent forbids pro se qui tam relators	Pro se relators cannot prosecute FCA actions; claim dismissed
Abuse of process by U.S. in prior action	Government’s actions were misuse of process and aimed at injustice	Acted within statutory and legal prerogative	No abuse shown; action within regular legal process

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard under Rule 12(b)(6); complaints require plausible factual allegations)
United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1994) (U.S. is real party in interest in FCA qui tam actions; non-attorneys may not act on its behalf)
Stoner v. Santa Clara Cnty. Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2007) (pro se litigants cannot prosecute qui tam actions for U.S.)
Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 2000) (liberal construction of pro se pleadings applies, but courts cannot supply missing claim elements)
Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1982) (courts may not supply essential claim elements not pled)