Light v. Seterus, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d 1210

Plaintiff Gregory Light sued on behalf of his client Conrad McPherson alleging TCPA and FDCPA violations arising from frequent calls by Seterus seeking mortgage-related information; action removed to federal court.
Plaintiff alleges Seterus used an automated dialing system to place numerous unsolicited calls (up to five times per day), including to Plaintiff’s cellphone and work phone beginning in July 2017.
Plaintiff alleges calls aimed to pressure McPherson to pay the debt, continued after Plaintiff (as McPherson’s attorney) requested that automated calls stop, and often repeated previously-answered questions.
Defendant moved to dismiss only the FDCPA count (Count II), arguing (1) it is not a “debt collector” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) and (2) plaintiff failed to plead intent to “annoy, abuse or harass” under § 1692d.
The Court evaluated the sufficiency of the allegations under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied the motion to dismiss Count II.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Seterus is a “debt collector” under the FDCPA	Complaint alleges Seterus was hired to collect the debt and its primary business is collecting payments for others	Allegations are conclusory; plaintiff failed to allege debt was in default when Seterus obtained it, which would create an exemption	Allegations sufficiently plead that Seterus is a “debt collector”; plaintiff need not plead absence of statutory exemptions at pleading stage
Whether calls were made with intent to “annoy, abuse or harass” under §1692d	Alleged pattern: repeated calls (up to 5/day), continued after request to stop automated calls, repeated questions — supports inference of intent to harass	Calls were informational (about property/Hurricane Irma); asking repeated questions or use of autodialer alone doesn’t show intent; plaintiff didn’t ask Seterus to stop all calls	Allegations viewed collectively are sufficient to plausibly allege conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse; claim survives 12(b)(6)

Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2006) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal standard and pleading sufficiency)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (application of Twombly plausibility standard)
Miljkovic v. Shafritz & Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2015) (attorney has standing to bring FDCPA claims on client’s behalf)
Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 797 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2015) (statutory definition of “debt collector” applies without regard to default status of underlying debt)
Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168 (11th Cir. 1985) (harassment under §1692d evaluated from the perspective of a relatively more vulnerable consumer; fact issue for jury)
Reese v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 686 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (creditors and mortgage servicers may fall outside FDCPA definition)
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Foxx, 971 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (owner/holder of mortgage not a “debt collector” under FDCPA)
Beeders v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (harassment involves patterns of conduct, not isolated acts)
Meadows v. Franklin Collection Serv., Inc., [citation="414 F. App'x 230"] (11th Cir. 2011) (§1692d list of prohibited conduct is non-exhaustive)