Liggins v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 321

Defendant Edward Liggins was tried by jury for first-degree murder and first-degree battery; convicted and sentenced to an aggregate 65 years (with firearm and child-in-presence enhancements).
During trial (after jury selection and after testimony had begun), Liggins sought to substitute retained counsel Teresa Bloodman for his public defenders and requested a continuance so she could prepare.
Bloodman had been retained that morning and told the court she was unprepared to try the case that week; she conditioned entry of appearance on a continuance (or mistrial).
The trial court denied the continuance as untimely, finding the request would require a mistrial, that Liggins had not been diligent in seeking new counsel, and that granting a continuance would disrupt the ongoing trial; the court later reopened the record, heard additional evidence, and reaffirmed the denial.
Liggins moved for a new trial (denied), appealed claiming a Sixth Amendment violation (right to counsel of choice); the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the court properly balanced interests and did not act arbitrarily.

Issue	Liggins' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether denying a mid-trial continuance to allow substitution of retained counsel violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice	Trial court failed to properly balance Liggins’s choice-of-counsel interest against court calendar and other factors; denial was premature and akin to Arroyo	Court permissibly balanced factors: request was untimely, counsel unprepared, substitution would force mistrial and disrupt trial, and defendant was not diligent	Court affirmed: denial was not arbitrary; trial court adequately considered relevant factors and properly exercised discretion

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (U.S. 2006) (trial courts balance right to counsel of choice against court’s scheduling and fairness concerns)
Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1964) (denial of continuance requires more than insistence on expeditiousness to violate rights)
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1983) (deference to trial-court decisions on counsel and scheduling matters)
United States v. Sellers, 645 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2011) (court must balance and not act arbitrarily when excluding chosen counsel)
Leggins v. State, 271 Ark. 616 (Ark. 1980) (once competent counsel obtained, substitute requests balanced against prompt administration of justice)
Thorne v. State, 269 Ark. 556 (Ark. 1980) (factors for evaluating continuance requests; case-by-case inquiry)
Arroyo v. State, 428 S.W.3d 464 (Ark. 2013) (reversal where court declined to hear substitute counsel and failed to consider defendant’s interests)