Lichtenstein v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 691 F.3d 294

Lichtenstein began at UPMC in 2005, transferred to Braddock in 2007, and was on a probationary period with no progressive discipline.
She faced chronic attendance/scheduling issues at Braddock, including tardies, absences, and last-minute schedule changes prior to December 2007.
A December 30, 2007 incident involved late arrival and early departure; Lichtenstein was later terminated on January 10, 2008.
On January 3, 2008, Lichtenstein’s mother was hospitalized; Lichtenstein called the nursing supervisor and stated she was in the emergency room and could not work that day.
UPMC cited attendance/scheduling as the termination basis, while Lichtenstein argued her January 3 leave was FMLA-protected and that this leave factored into the decision.
The District Court granted summary judgment to UPMC; the Third Circuit vacated and remanded to resolve issues on notice, causation, and pretext.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Adequacy of FMLA notice	Lichtenstein's January 3 call provided sufficient notice that FMLA may apply.	Notice was insufficient to show a qualifying FMLA reason.	Genuine dispute as to notice exists; factual question for trial.
Causation between FMLA leave and termination	Termination was triggered or influenced by the January 3 FMLA leave.	Termination based on pre-existing attendance issues; no causal link shown.	Sufficient evidence to support causal inference at this stage.
Pretext for retaliation	Timing and contradictions show the stated reasons are pretextual.	Reasons were legitimate and not pretextual.	Evidence raises genuine doubt about the proffered reasons; pretext exists.
Interference vs. retaliation theory viability	Interference claim stands alongside retaliation as a basis for FMLA violation.	Interference duplicative of retaliation; burden analysis applies similarly.	Court analyzed as part of retaliation framework; interference claim unresolved on remand.

Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398 (3d Cir.2007) (notice need not be formal; what is conveyed is interpreted reasonably)
Brenneman v. MedCentral Health Sys., 366 F.3d 412 (6th Cir.2004) (FMLA notice not onerous; inquiry may be required)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Supreme Court 1973) (burden-shifting framework for circumstantial evidence)
Conoshenti v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135 (3d Cir.2004) (discusses whether FMLA retaliation claims fall under §2615(a)(1))
LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217 (3d Cir.2007) (causation framework for retaliation based on temporal proximity)
Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701 (3d Cir.1989) (temporal proximity used to infer causation in retaliation cases)
Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274 (6th Cir.2012) (temporal proximity considerations in causation analysis)
Wierman v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984 (8th Cir.2011) (causation and timing in retaliation analyses)
Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271 (3d Cir.2000) (causation standard for prima facie case of retaliation)
Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986 (3d Cir.1997) (credibility and pretext considerations in retaliation)