Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Casey, AC 16-P-32

Background

On June 26, 2013, 17-year-old Ryan Casey (after drinking and smoking marijuana) twice attacked 17-year-old Evan Williams, punching and kicking him in the face and causing serious bodily injury.
Casey admitted planning at least the initial attack, executed “sucker punches,” repositioned to attack again, and later pleaded guilty to assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and assault and battery causing serious bodily harm.
Williams claimed medical payments and damages under the Liberty Mutual homeowners policy covering Casey's family home; Liberty Mutual filed for declaratory relief denying coverage based on the policy exclusion for bodily injury "expected or intended by the insured."
The Superior Court granted Liberty Mutual’s summary judgment motion, concluding as a matter of law that Casey intended or expected to cause bodily injury and thus the exclusion applied; Williams and Casey appealed.
The appellate court reviewed summary judgment de novo, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovants, and focused on whether, despite intoxication, there was no genuine dispute that Casey intended or knew with substantial certainty some injury would result.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the policy exclusion for bodily injury "expected or intended by the insured" bars coverage	Williams/Casey: Casey's voluntary intoxication could have prevented formation of intent to injure; factual dispute exists about intent	Liberty Mutual: Casey planned and intended to hit Williams; nature of acts (punching/kicking face) mandates inference of intent to injure as a matter of law	Held: Exclusion applies; as matter of law intent to injure inferred from the inherently harmful acts and Casey's admissions
Whether voluntary intoxication creates a genuine issue of fact on capacity to form intent	Casey: Intoxication undermines capacity to form intent; deposition statements assert loss of control	Liberty Mutual: Record shows Casey planned, executed, and later admitted he intended to touch and knew hitting would cause injury	Held: Intoxication here did not create a genuine dispute; Casey retained capacity and formed plan and intent
Whether the insurer met its burden on summary judgment to negate a material fact issue on intent	Williams/Casey: Motive and intoxication raise factual disputes unsuitable for summary judgment	Liberty Mutual: Submitted interviews, deposition, plea, and facts showing motive, planning, and admissions	Held: Liberty Mutual met burden; summary judgment appropriate
Whether subjective claim of not intending to injure overcomes inference from the nature of the act	Casey: Claimed he didn’t intend injury despite admitting to hitting	Liberty Mutual: Under Fells Acres and related precedent, striking someone in the face supports inference of intent to injure regardless of claim	Held: Court rejected Casey’s contrary statement; nature of acts controls and infers intent

Key Cases Cited

Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Abernathy, 393 Mass. 81 (1984) (clarifies "expected or intended" excludes injuries the insured knew to a substantial certainty would result)
Newton v. Krasnigor, 404 Mass. 682 (1989) (infers intent from inherently harmful acts such as intentionally setting fire)
Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 408 Mass. 393 (1990) (acts like striking another in the face permit inference, as a matter of law, that harm was intended)
Hanover Ins. Co. v. Talhouni, 413 Mass. 781 (1992) (intoxication may negate capacity to form intent where defendant was delusional and unaware of his actions)
Doe v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 423 Mass. 366 (1996) (intent to injure can be inferred as a matter of law in cases of unlawful sexual conduct toward a minor)
Kowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d 299 (1st Cir. 1990) (articulates standard that intent includes knowing with substantial certainty that injury will result)