Libertarian Party of Illinois v. John Cunningham
872 F.3d 518
7th Cir.2017Background
- Illinois law distinguishes established parties (≥5% in prior elections) from new parties; new parties must submit nominating petitions with signatures and, uniquely, a full slate of candidates for every office in the relevant political subdivision.
- Independents face similar signature requirements but are not subject to the full-slate rule.
- In 2012 the Libertarian Party of Illinois sought to nominate a Kane County auditor candidate but lacked both the signature threshold and a full slate, prompting suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/10-2.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the Libertarian Party, holding the full-slate requirement unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; Illinois appealed.
- The Seventh Circuit considered standing, rejected Illinois’s contention that relief wouldn’t redress the party’s injury, and reached the merits on ballot-access and associational-rights grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Illinois’s full-slate requirement for new parties violate First Amendment political-association and voters’ rights? | The full-slate rule severely burdens minor parties and candidates by forcing parties to run unwanted campaigns to secure ballot access. | The rule furthers compelling interests in political stability, preventing ballot overcrowding, and avoiding voter confusion. | Held unconstitutional: the requirement severely burdens rights and is not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. |
| Does the Libertarian Party have Article III standing to seek prospective relief? | The full-slate rule is an ongoing barrier that raises ballot-access costs and thus injures the party’s associational rights. | Because the Party also failed the signature requirement, relief would not redress its inability to appear on the 2012 ballot. | Held: Party has standing; the full-slate rule is a continuing obstacle and prospective relief is redressive. |
| Is the signature requirement sufficient to limit weak parties and serve state interests? | Signature requirement already filters weak parties; full-slate is unnecessary and counterproductive. | Full-slate helps ensure only parties with organizational capacity (or support) reach ballots, promoting stability. | Held: Signature requirement suffices; full-slate incentivizes sham candidacies and undermines stated interests. |
| Are prior Supreme Court precedents (Timmons; Washington State Grange) controlling to allow Illinois’s rule? | N/A (plaintiff argued full-slate directly burdens ballot access). | Relied on Timmons and Washington State Grange to argue there is no absolute right to party-label placement or to limit party control over ballot labeling. | Held: Those cases do not control; neither upholds a severe ballot-access restriction like Illinois’s full-slate rule. |
Key Cases Cited
- Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (upheld antipfusion statute; discussed limits on candidates parties may select)
- Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (recognized ballot access as central to party and voter rights)
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (articulated balancing test for ballot-access burdens on voters and candidates)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (adopted flexible balancing standard for election regulations)
- Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (addressed forced party-preference designations; declined to decide ballot-access implications)
- Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992) (severe restrictions on associational rights require narrow tailoring to compelling interests)
- Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (recognized state interests in stability, avoiding overcrowding, and preventing confusion)