Libertarian Party of Connecticut v. Lamont
977 F.3d 173
2d Cir.2020Background
- Plaintiffs: Libertarian Party of Connecticut and two affiliated candidates (Harold Harris, Daniel Reale) sued Governor Ned Lamont and Secretary of State Denise Merrill alleging Connecticut’s petition-signature requirement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments given COVID-19 restrictions; they sought a mandatory preliminary injunction placing their nominees on the November 2020 ballot.
- Connecticut law: parties that received >1% of the prior vote automatically qualify; other candidates must gather the lesser of 1% of prior votes or 7,500 signatures and file by 90 days before the election (2020 petition period ran ~Jan 2–Aug 7).
- COVID response: the Governor’s emergency orders and Executive Order 7LL modified petitioning in 2020 by reducing signature counts 30%, extending the deadline two days, and permitting mail/electronic collection; plaintiffs argued earlier orders effectively prohibited in-person petitioning and that alternatives were impractical.
- District court: denied the preliminary injunction, concluding the petitioning law imposed a reasonable, nondiscriminatory burden and that plaintiffs had not shown a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
- Second Circuit: expedited appeal and affirmed—applying the Anderson–Burdick framework, the court held the burden was not “severe” because a reasonably diligent candidate could still qualify (evidence showed petitioning was possible during the pandemic) and Connecticut’s interest in limiting ballot access justified the requirement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Connecticut's petition-signature regime, as applied during COVID-19, imposed a "severe" burden under Anderson–Burdick | Signature gathering was effectively prohibited or rendered infeasible by executive orders and pandemic conditions, making ballot access virtually impossible | Petitioning remained feasible (EO7LL eased requirements; state guidance allowed in-person with distancing; examples showed candidates obtained signatures); requirement is facially reasonable | Not severe: a reasonably diligent candidate could still qualify; district court did not err |
| Whether the State’s interests justify the burden | Even modest burdens are unconstitutional given pandemic-driven barriers | State has an important interest in requiring a preliminary showing of support to avoid ballot clutter and voter confusion; signature requirements serve that interest | Justified: the State’s interest in demonstrable support outweighs the nondiscriminatory burden |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (establishes the Anderson–Burdick balancing framework for election regulations)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (clarifies that severe burdens require strict scrutiny; lesser burdens are justified by important regulatory interests)
- LaRouche v. Kezer, 990 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1993) (applies Anderson–Burdick to uphold Connecticut signature requirements as reasonable)
- Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (examines substantial signature thresholds and feasibility for ballot access)
- American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (upholds a 1% signature requirement as not unduly onerous and justified by ballot regulation interests)
- Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (recognizes permissible state regulation of ballot access and signature requirements)
- Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2006) (explains higher showing required for mandatory preliminary injunctions)
- Libertarian Party of Ky. v. Grimes, 835 F.3d 570 (6th Cir. 2016) (identifies exclusion or virtual exclusion from the ballot as the hallmark of a severe burden)
- Stone v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 750 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2014) (uses the ‘reasonably diligent candidate’ test to assess whether signature requirements are feasible)