Libertarian Party of Arkansas v. John Thurston, 962 F.3d 390

Background:

Arkansas amended its whole-ballot party petition rules in 2019 to (1) raise the signature requirement to 3% of votes cast in the last gubernatorial election (about 27,000; effectively ~1.5% of registered voters) and (2) move the submission deadline to roughly 425 days before the general election, with only a rolling 90‑day signature window.
The Libertarian Party of Arkansas (the Party) previously qualified under the prior 10,000‑signature rule and had succeeded in obtaining ballot access multiple times; it challenged the new statute as imposing a collective, severe burden on associational and voting rights.
At the preliminary‑injunction hearing, the Party presented testimony and affidavits claiming it could not meet the new requirements without prohibitive cost and that earlier deadlines reduced voter interest and signature validity; the State offered testimony that paid/combined canvassing could feasibly meet the requirements.
The district court found the combined effect of the high numerosity requirement, the 90‑day rolling window, and the very early deadline imposed a burden of some substance, applied strict scrutiny, and granted preliminary relief by enjoining enforcement of the higher (3%) signature requirement and ordering the Secretary of State to accept petitions meeting the prior 10,000‑signature threshold—without changing deadlines.
The State appealed the grant and the form of relief; the Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing strict scrutiny applied, concluding the combined scheme was not narrowly tailored to asserted interests, and finding the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning the injunction.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the combined requirements (3% numerosity, 90‑day rolling window, deadline ~425 days pre‑election) impose a substantial burden triggering strict scrutiny	The combination severely burdens party associational and voters' rights and effectively precludes new‑party access	The numerosity is comparable to other upheld regimes, no geographic limits, and compliance is feasible with paid/combined canvassers; deadline tied to primary scheduling	Court: strict scrutiny applies; the combined regime imposes a burden of some substance and is likely unconstitutional
Whether the State articulates a compelling interest and whether the statute is narrowly tailored	State lacks a compelling interest; prior, less restrictive rules prevented overcrowding, so change is arbitrary	Interests include election integrity, preventing frivolous candidates/overcrowding, and aligning primaries with Super Tuesday	Court: skeptical that asserted interests are compelling; even assuming they are, the statute is not narrowly tailored (deadline unrelated to petitioning)
Whether the district court abused its discretion in granting preliminary injunction and limiting relief to the signature requirement (not changing deadlines)	Relief limited to signature count is necessary and less disruptive to complex primary calendar	Injunction should have addressed deadlines if that was the main problem; remedy was improperly tailored	Court: no abuse of discretion—equitable relief may be tailored; enjoining the higher signature requirement was conservative, workable, and justified
Whether Plaintiffs proved likelihood of success and irreparable harm to justify preliminary relief	Testimony/history showed past inability to meet higher requirement, funding limits, and reduced signature validity under rushed drives	State offered contrary expert testimony showing feasible compliance and techniques to meet thresholds	Court: district court's factual findings not clearly erroneous; Plaintiffs likely to succeed and face irreparable harm outweighing the State's limited injury

Key Cases Cited:

Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981) (four‑factor preliminary‑injunction balancing test)
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 2008) (heightened likelihood‑of‑success standard for enjoining state statutes)
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (no litmus‑test; early deadlines can unduly burden independent or new candidates)
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (upheld 5% signature requirement with more forgiving deadline)
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (struck down very high numerosity + early deadline for new parties)
McLain v. Meier (McLain I), 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980) (invalidated high‑numerosity/new‑party deadline substantially before primaries)
McLain v. Meier (McLain II), 851 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir. 1988) (approved reduced numerosity with still‑early deadline but noted deadline concern)
Moore v. Martin, 649 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2011) (importance of alternative paths to ballot access)
Moore v. Martin, 854 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 2017) (applied strict scrutiny to independent‑candidate petitioning regime with early deadline)
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (severe burdens require narrow tailoring to a compelling interest)
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (lesser burdens permit deferential review; state’s important regulatory interests suffice)
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (past experience and alternative access routes inform narrow‑tailoring analysis)