924 F.3d 533
D.C. Cir.2019Background
- Joseph Shaber bequeathed $235,575.20 to the Libertarian National Committee (LNC) after his death in 2015.
- FECA (as interpreted by the FEC) capped annual contributions to national party committees at an inflation-adjusted limit ($33,400 in 2015), and treats estates/deceased donors as “persons.”
- A 2014 amendment (the “cromnibus” amendment) allowed donors to give up to three times the base limit into three dedicated, segregated party accounts (conventions, headquarters, recounts/legal), effectively permitting up to $334,000 in total per donor per year for those combined accounts in 2015.
- The LNC accepted only $33,400 into its general account and entered an escrow agreement for the remainder at the FEC’s direction; the escrow barred LNC control over undisbursed funds unless a court invalidated the limits.
- The LNC sued seeking (1) a declaration that applying FECA limits to Shaber’s bequest violates its First Amendment rights, and (2) that FECA’s two-tiered scheme (general vs. segregated-account limits) is facially and as-applied unconstitutional; the district court certified constitutional questions to the en banc D.C. Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Do annual contribution limits as applied to Shaber's bequest violate LNC's First Amendment rights? | Limits unlawfully restrict LNC's speech in using the bequest; bequests are different because donor is dead. | Limits are justified to prevent quid pro quo corruption and its appearance, and apply to estates; prophylactic limits are permissible. | No — applying FECA limits to Shaber's bequest does not violate the First Amendment. |
| 2) Does FECA's two-tiered scheme (allowing larger contributions only into segregated-purpose accounts) facially violate the First Amendment? | The scheme transforms contribution limits into content/purpose-based restrictions on party speech and merits strict scrutiny. | The scheme remains a contribution-limit regime (not an expenditure limit or content-based restriction) and is subject to closely drawn scrutiny. | No — the two-tiered scheme is a permissible contribution limit and survives closely drawn scrutiny on its face. |
| 3) Does the two-tiered scheme as applied to Shaber's bequest violate the First Amendment? | Even as applied, purpose-restrictions on funds burden LNC speech and are not closely tailored to anti-corruption interests. | As applied, the scheme does not prevent LNC from spending unrestricted funds and furthers anticorruption interests; escrow remedy provides redress. | No — as applied to Shaber's bequest, the scheme does not violate the First Amendment. |
| 4) Standing: Does LNC have Article III standing to sue? | LNC alleges cognizable injury from not having immediate, unconstrained use of full bequest. | LNC created its own injury by entering escrow and money is fungible; past harm is not redressable. | Yes — LNC has standing; escrow still holds funds and court relief could provide access, and injury is fairly traceable to FECA/FEC. |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (established framework distinguishing contribution limits from expenditure limits and applied intermediate/closely drawn scrutiny to contribution limits)
- McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upheld soft-money restrictions and treated limits on party contributions as valid prophylactic anti-corruption measures)
- McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (plurality) (discussed the government’s anti-corruption interest and contours of closely drawn scrutiny for contribution limits)
- Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (addressed independent expenditures and limits on corporate speech; distinguished prophylactic contribution regulation)
- SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (held contribution limits unconstitutional as applied to groups making only independent expenditures)
- Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (recognized the intermediate/closely drawn standard for contribution limits)
- Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (plurality) (explained that contribution limits fail if they prevent amassing resources necessary for effective advocacy)