Libbey v. Village of Atlantic Beach
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158290
E.D.N.Y2013Background
- The Libbey family (multiple plaintiffs including property owner M.A. Salazar, Inc. and individual family members) sued the Village of Atlantic Beach, two municipal officials, and two engineering firms under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state-law claims after the Village ordered and ultimately demolished a mixed-use building at 2035 Park Street and issued citations under a Political Sign Ordinance.
- Prior proceedings: (1) Village condemnation hearing (Sept. 6, 2011) that led to a demolition order; (2) Article 78 state-court challenges and a denied TRO; and (3) Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings where the Bankruptcy Court issued a ‘‘Fence Order’’ and later proceedings found the Village violated that order on appeal.
- Plaintiffs alleged First Amendment retaliation, substantive and procedural due process, Fourth Amendment seizure, takings, equal protection, various state torts, and state constitutional claims; they also sought a preliminary injunction to block sale of the property and prosecution under the Political Sign Ordinance.
- Magistrate Judge Lindsay recommended denying the preliminary injunction as moot after the Village repealed the Political Sign Ordinance and represented it would not re-prosecute; the District Judge adopted that R&R and denied the PI requests.
- Defendants moved to dismiss on multiple grounds (Rooker–Feldman, res judicata/collateral estoppel, prior pending action, standing, statute of limitations, notice-of-claim, immunity). The court dismissed some claims and parties but allowed most constitutional claims and certain state claims to proceed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preliminary injunction to block prosecution under Political Sign Ordinance | Village’s repeal and dismissal insufficient; tickets not dismissed with prejudice and risk of prosecution | Ordinance repealed, tickets dismissed, Village represented no re-prosecution; mootness applies | Denied as moot; R&R adopted (PI denied) |
| Rooker–Feldman jurisdictional bar over demolition-related claims | Claims arise from defendants’ unconstitutional conduct, not an attempt to appeal state-court rulings | Federal suit is an improper attack on state-court decisions about demolition | Rooker–Feldman does not bar the federal claims; motion to dismiss on this ground denied |
| Collateral estoppel/res judicata as to demolition issues | State hearings did not resolve the constitutional and abuse-of-authority issues alleged | State findings on disrepair preclude relitigation | Res judicata denied; collateral estoppel limited to narrow issue (no preclusion of Plaintiffs’ federal claims) |
| Standing for various plaintiffs (demolition and sign claims) | Multiple plaintiffs affected by demolition and sign enforcement | Only property owner (M.A. Salazar) and the cited individual have standing | Dismissed Pamela Makaea; other plaintiffs retained standing for specified claims; some plaintiffs lacked standing for sign claims (granted in part) |
| Substantive due process claim re: demolition | Arbitrary, selective abuse of municipal authority deprived property rights | Demolition was safety-driven and adjudicated in state proceedings | Substantive due process dismissed with prejudice because Fourth Amendment governs seizure/demolition claims |
| Procedural due process and Fourth Amendment seizure | Article 78 and state process were inadequate given alleged systemic abuse and timing of actions | State proceedings afforded adequate process; decision supports demolition | Procedural due process and Fourth Amendment claims survive dismissal (questions of adequacy and reasonableness remain) |
| Equal Protection (selective enforcement) | Political Sign Ordinance targeted Libbeys; other comparable signs were not enforced | Plaintiffs fail to identify proper comparators or facts showing selective enforcement | Equal protection claim tied to demolition dismissed for lack of comparators; claim tied to sign ordinance survives (sufficient comparators alleged) |
| First Amendment retaliation | Series of retaliatory enforcement acts chilled plaintiffs’ political speech; continuing violation | Many acts are time-barred; no adequate pleading of motive or chill | Claims predating April 15, 2010 dismissed as time-barred; timely retaliation claims survive pleading-stage challenge |
| State tort claims: statute of limitations and notice of claim | Continuous course of conduct tolled limitations; notice of claim filed Dec. 1, 2011 suffices | Most tort claims relate to demolition (discrete act) and are time-barred; many claims required timely municipal notice | Trespass and tortious interference time-barred (dismissed with prejudice); multiple torts dismissed for failure to timely serve notice of claim (with prejudice) |
| Section 1983 liability of private engineers (R&W, Williams) | Engineers conspired with municipal actors; acted under color of state law | Engineers were private actors offering opinions; no meeting-of-the-minds alleged | Claims against Engineering Defendants dismissed for failure to plausibly plead state-action/conspiracy; R&W and Williams terminated as defendants |
| Municipal/official immunities (legislative, qualified) | Plaintiffs challenge enforcement acts not legislative acts; pleadings allege improper motive | Defendants invoke legislative and qualified immunity | Legislative immunity rejected (enforcement acts); qualified immunity denied at motion stage given alleged improper motive and factual disputes |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: legal conclusions not entitled to assumption of truth; plausibility requirement)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (limits of Rooker–Feldman doctrine; doctrine confined to attempts to review state-court judgments)
- Lamar Advertising of Pennsylvania LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 356 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2004) (voluntary cessation/mootness standard for injunctive relief)
- Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (substantive due process claims controlled by specific constitutional provisions when applicable)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity standard)
- Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim)
- DeBari v. Town of Middleton, 9 F. Supp. 2d 156 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (demolition as a Fourth Amendment seizure; reasonableness inquiry)