Leyman v. Bradshaw (Slip Opinion)
146 Ohio St. 3d 522
| Ohio | 2016Background
- Donald Leyman was convicted in 1999 of rape (of his former stepson) and gross sexual imposition (GSI) for acts alleged to have occurred when the victims were young; he received concurrent sentences and remains incarcerated for the rape conviction.
- The alleged abuse spanned years when the family lived in both New York and Ohio; the stepson testified he was six to eight when the events occurred and could not recall his location at the time; the mother testified the family lived in Ohio after August/September 1993.
- Leyman pursued postconviction relief and attempts to reopen his direct appeal; those efforts were denied and affirmed on appeal.
- Leyman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under R.C. 2901.11 (relying on State v. Yarbrough), and thus he is entitled to immediate release.
- The Fifth District dismissed the habeas petition; the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court had jurisdiction under R.C. 2901.11(D), which treats an offense as taking place in Ohio when it cannot reasonably be determined where an element occurred and there is evidence it may have occurred in Ohio.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the trial court lack subject-matter jurisdiction over Leyman’s rape conviction under R.C. 2901.11? | Leyman: Yarbrough and R.C. 2901.11(B) show jurisdictional limits where the relevant conduct occurred out-of-state; therefore Ohio lacked jurisdiction. | State: Yarbrough and R.C. 2901.11(B) concern homicide only; R.C. 2901.11(D) applies and presumes the offense occurred in Ohio when it cannot be determined and there is evidence it may have. | Court: Trial court had jurisdiction under R.C. 2901.11(D); habeas relief denied. |
| Is habeas corpus available despite other remedies? | Leyman: Habeas proper because judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction. | State: Habeas is proper only if judgment is void; jurisdiction exists here, so habeas is not available. | Court: Habeas unavailable because judgment was not void. |
| Does Yarbrough’s reasoning control non-homicide offenses? | Leyman: Yarbrough’s statutory interpretation of R.C. 2901.11 demonstrates limits on jurisdiction generally. | State: Yarbrough interpreted subsection (B) applicable to homicide; it does not govern rape/GSI. | Court: Yarbrough is limited to homicide provision; not controlling here. |
| Could the evidence reasonably place the offenses in Ohio? | Leyman: Victim could not recall location, arguing uncertainty undermines Ohio jurisdiction. | State: Testimony showed the family lived in Ohio during the relevant period; under 2901.11(D), the offenses are presumed to have occurred in Ohio. | Court: Evidence supports presumption under 2901.11(D); jurisdiction proper. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Yarbrough, 104 Ohio St.3d 1, 817 N.E.2d 845 (2004) (interpreting R.C. 2901.11(B) as limiting jurisdiction for homicide to where the fatal act or contact occurred)
- Scanlon v. Brunsman, 112 Ohio St.3d 151, 858 N.E.2d 411 (2006) (habeas may grant immediate release only when petitioner is unlawfully restrained and entitled to immediate release)
- Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 656 N.E.2d 1282 (1995) (habeas is available to attack void judgments for lack of jurisdiction)
- Heddleston v. Mack, 84 Ohio St.3d 213, 702 N.E.2d 1198 (1998) (habeas corpus generally available only when maximum sentence has expired)