Leyja v. Parker, 404 F. App'x 291

Background

Christopher Leyja, a state prisoner, seeks a COA to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition and his forma pauperis status.
The district court adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation denying habeas relief and denied a COA, holding Leyja failed to show a debatable constitutional issue.
Leyja’s convictions in Oklahoma state court were for first‑degree rape, first‑degree burglary, and forcible oral sodomy, with consecutive sentences totaling 100 years.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed on direct appeal; Leyja’s state post‑conviction relief attempts were unsuccessful.
We review for COA under AEDPA, applying deference to the state court’s merits determinations and procedural rulings.
The panel granted in part the en banc request to amend the opinion and issued an order denying the COA and dismissing the appeal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Leyja is entitled to a COA on appeal.	Leyja contends the district court erred in denying COA on multiple habeas claims.	The state court decisions were reasonable under AEDPA; Leyja cannot show a debatable constitutional issue.	No COA is granted; petition is denied and appeal dismissed.
Whether admission of a medical diagram violated the Sixth Amendment confrontation right.	OCCA’s conclusion on non‑testimonial diagram was clearly established; Melendez‑Diaz undermines this.	At the time of trial, unresolved authority meant OCCA acted reasonably; the diagram was not clearly testimonial.	Not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Whether the 1966 study referenced by the expert constituted Brady material.	Suppression of the study could impeach the expert and is Brady material.	The 1966 study would not have substantially impeached the expert; evidence was speculative.	No Brady violation; study did not render the trial unfair.
Whether the prosecutors’ failure to locate a witness amounts to Brady material.	The witness could have testified to facts favorable to Leyja and suppression violated Brady.	Even if true, the witness’s testimony would not have changed the outcome.	No Brady violation; suppression did not alter the result.
Whether Leyja’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel entitle relief.	Counsel failed to call witnesses and to raise ineffectiveness issues on appeal.	The magistrate judge’s conclusions were reasonable; strategic decisions did not prejudice the trial or appeal.	COA denied; claims are without merit.

Key Cases Cited

Melendez‑Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (Supreme Court 2009) (laboratory reports are testimonial evidence requiring confrontation)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Supreme Court 2004) (confrontation clause requires cross‑examination of testimonial statements)
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court 2000) (COA standard requires a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court 1984) (ineffective assistance standard: reasonable probability of different outcome)
Miller‑El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (Supreme Court 2003) (COA requires substantial showing by movant that merits could be debated)
Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935 (10th Cir. 2004) (AEDPA deferential review applied to state court decisions)
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (Supreme Court 1993) (actual innocence claims do not by themselves render a federal habeas petition meritorious)
United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir. 1995) (reliance on case law in evaluating evidentiary claims)
Sandoval v. Ulibarri, 548 F.3d 902 (10th Cir. 2008) (speculative Brady claims fail when impeachment impact is speculative)
Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2000) (establishing the level of trial error under AEDPA review)