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Lexington Insurance v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance
81 A.3d 903
Pa. Super. Ct.
2013
Read the full case

Background

  • CMX maintained a Hartford general liability policy and a Lexington professional liability policy as the City’s site project insurer and indemnitor via CMX's contract.
  • JPC-Jay Dee formed a joint venture and contracted with the City; JPC/CMX subcontract required $10 million primary, noncontributing coverage and CMX to be named as additional insured.
  • JPC obtained coverage from Charter Oak (primary $1M) and North River ($20M umbrella); CMX was an additional insured under North River, with coverage limited by underlying contracts.
  • In September 2007, Albert Childs was injured at the project; the Childs action named multiple defendants, including CMX; CMX faced expert claims of professional negligence but the underlying actions included general negligence as well.
  • Dec. 3, 2009: Joint Tortfeasor Release settled with City, contractor, and subcontractors for $10 million; Charter Oak paid $1 million, North River paid $9 million; CMX separately settled for $2 million (Lexington paid).
  • CMX tendered defense to North River; North River consistently declined to contribute, arguing no duty to defend under its policy; suit filed January 2010, Lexington substituted in April 2011.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
When does North River's duty to defend arise for CMX? Lexington argues exhaustion of underlying/other insurance triggers North River's defense duty upon payment. North River contends exhaustion and timing render no early defense duty before actual payments. Exhaustion and payment trigger North River's defense duty; duty arose upon payment of underlying limits.
Does Hartford other-insurance affect North River's duty to defend? Hartford is other insurance; its exhaustion should trigger North River's duty. Hartford should not be treated as reducing North River's coverage; its exhaustion is irrelevant. Hartford is excess to North River; exhaustion of North River occurred with Charter Oak payment, triggering defense duty.
Whether North River's professional services exclusion bars defense The underlying complaint cannot be confined to professional services; duty to defend persists. Professional services exclusion may negate defense if claims fall outside coverage. Not determined at start; the complaint could be within coverage; defense obligation persists until scope is narrowed.
Is an insurer allowed to await actual payment to trigger defense, given potential settlement tactics? Excess insurer should be able to defend upon exhaustion by payment. Waiting to see settlements avoids premature defense obligations. Excess insurer's duty to defend is triggered by actual payment of underlying limits.

Key Cases Cited

  • Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 23 F.2d 665 (2d Cir.1928) (exhaustion ambiguous; excess policy may cover the excess amount)
  • Koppers Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440 (3d Cir.1996) (settlement with primary insurer effectively exhausts primary coverage)
  • Ali v. Fed. Ins. Co., 719 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.2013) (excess insurers have interest in awaiting payment and avoiding premature defense)
  • American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 606 Pa.584 (Pa. 2010) (duty to defend is broader than indemnity; based on potential coverage from four-corner comparison)
  • Cadwallader v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 396 Pa.582 (Pa. 1959) (duty to defend may persist until claims are confined; need mechanism to reexamine scope)
  • Germantown Ins. Co. v. Martin, 407 Pa. Super. 326 (Pa. Super.2000) (court may reexamine scope of underlying claims to determine defense duty)
  • Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Roe, 437 Pa. Super. 414 (Pa. Super.1994) (insured’s potential coverage governs defense duty subject to scope of policy)
  • Stidham v. Millvale Sportsmen’s Club, 421 Pa. Super. 548 (Pa. Super.1992) (path to declaratory relief to reexamine underlying claims)
  • Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Long, 528 Pa. 295 (Pa. 1991) (timing of defense under exhaustion principles)
  • Baumhammers, U.S., 938 A.2d 286 (Pa. 2007) (interpretation of insurance contracts; policy language controls)
  • Genaeya Corp. v. Harco Nat. Ins. Co., 991 A.2d 342 (Pa. Super.2010) (insurer must be allowed to examine underlying claims to limit coverage)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Lexington Insurance v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance
Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Nov 6, 2013
Citation: 81 A.3d 903
Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.