Lewis v. Transit Mgmt. Of CharlotteÂ
250 N.C. App. 619
| N.C. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Kelly Lewis, a bus operator, was rear-ended on June 15, 2009; employer (Transit Management of Charlotte) reported the injury and paid TTD and medical benefits.
- Forms filed in late 2009 indicated final payments; parties later stipulated an April 22, 2010 claims-payment entry was the last actual medical payment.
- Lewis filed a Form 33 on May 5, 2014 seeking additional medical treatment and additional TTD (alleging underpayment due to wage miscalculation).
- The deputy commissioner awarded Lewis relief; the Full Commission modified, ordering a $714.90 corrective TTD payment but holding Lewis’s claim for additional medical treatment time-barred under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25.1.
- Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals; the principal legal question was the meaning of “last payment” under the two-year medical-limit statute and whether equitable doctrines (laches/estoppel) could bar Lewis’s claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lewis’s May 2014 application for additional medical compensation was time-barred under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25.1 | The two-year period had not begun because defendant made a corrective indemnity payment on Dec. 7, 2015, so the “last payment” occurred after Lewis’s filing | The last actual payment of medical or indemnity compensation was April 22, 2010; § 97-25.1 therefore barred the May 2014 claim | Court affirmed Commission: the statute’s “last payment” means the most recent actual payment (April 22, 2010), so Lewis’s May 2014 medical claim was time-barred |
| Whether a corrective payment after the Commission’s decision restarts the § 97-25.1 limitations period | Corrective indemnity payment should be treated as a new “last payment,” restarting the two-year period | Corrective payments do not retroactively affect the already-expired limitations period; treating corrections as restarts would undermine the statute’s purpose | Court declined to decide definitively; noted statute is unclear on corrective payments but held the Dec. 7, 2015 corrective payment could not be treated as the “last payment” for the Commission’s Nov. 20, 2015 decision because it had not yet been made |
| Whether defendant could invoke laches/estoppel to bar Lewis’s claim for corrective TTD owed from 2009 | Lewis did not raise laches | Defendant argued equity should bar the claim because of long delay in challenging average weekly wage | Court held equitable doctrines are not available where statutory remedies at law (§§ 97-25.1 and 97-47) exist; laches/estoppel not applied |
| Whether § 97-47 (review for change in condition) or a final award was implicated to limit review | Lewis did not rely on § 97-47 to avoid limits | Defendant argued remedy at law under § 97-47 was inconsistent with Commission action | Court affirmed Commission: no final award had occurred so § 97-47’s review-triggering rules did not apply; Commission’s rulings consistent |
Key Cases Cited
- Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Grp., 362 N.C. 657 (recognizes scope of appellate review of Industrial Commission findings and conclusions)
- Busque v. Mid-America Apartment Communities, 209 N.C. App. 696 (statute § 97-25.1 construed to start from last actual payment; claim filed more than two years later barred)
- Pomeroy v. Tanner Masonry, 151 N.C. App. 171 (defining “change in condition” and when § 97-47 review is available)
- Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660 (no § 97-47 relief without a final award)
- Miller v. Carolinas Med. Ctr.-Northeast, 233 N.C. App. 342 (contract-based verification in Form 21; reasonable-time principle for seeking verification — distinguished on facts)