301 Ga. 759
Ga.2017Background
- Devasko Lewis was convicted of malice murder and related offenses for hiring Jamarcus Clark to obtain truck titles/money and to kill Lewis’s business partner; Clark actually shot Kerry Glenn (Daniels’s nephew).
- Clark and Tony Taylor testified that Lewis hired Clark, supplied a truck, paid money, and used a disposable phone to communicate; corroborating evidence included surveillance, cell‑phone records, motive, and payments observed by Taylor.
- Lewis testified and argued the accomplice witnesses were impeached and contradictory; he claimed insufficent corroboration for accomplice testimony under OCGA § 24‑14‑8.
- After trial, an envelope and a handwritten/printed letter allegedly from Clark recanted his trial testimony; at the new‑trial hearing Clark refused to admit authorship or recant under oath.
- The trial court denied the new‑trial motion, finding the letter merely impeaching and not establishing "purest fabrication" or perjury; Lewis appealed raising sufficiency, recantation/new‑trial standards (and related constitutional challenges), and a sentencing challenge under Alleyne/Apprendi.
Issues
| Issue | Lewis’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency / corroboration of accomplice testimony | Clark’s and Taylor’s testimony was uncorroborated or contradicted; insufficient under OCGA § 24‑14‑8 | Corroboration may be slight and circumstantial; independent evidence (surveillance, phone records, payments, motive) supported jury verdict | Evidence (including slight circumstantial corroboration) was sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia to support convictions |
| Post‑trial recantation / new trial | Clark’s letter shows his trial testimony was fabricated; requires new trial | Recantation is generally only impeaching; without perjury conviction or proof of impossibility, new trial not required | Denial of new trial affirmed; letter was at best impeaching and Clark did not admit authorship under oath |
| Constitutional challenge to statute requiring perjury conviction (OCGA § 17‑1‑4) | Statute unconstitutionally limits trial court discretion and denies due process/equal protection when a witness later admits lying | Statute valid; perjury‑conviction requirement ensures reliable proof before vacating verdict; prior Georgia precedent rejects challenge | Challenge rejected; precedent (Burke/Chatterton) upholds statute and equal protection/due process finding |
| Murder sentencing (life without parole) under Alleyne/Apprendi | Imposition of life without parole increases mandatory minimum and requires jury finding beyond reasonable doubt | Sentencing range is authorized by statute; judge’s selection does not increase mandatory minimum under Alleyne or exceed statutory maximum under Apprendi | Statute constitutional as applied; judge may impose life or life without parole without additional jury findings |
Key Cases Cited
- Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650 (2015) (slight circumstantial evidence can corroborate an accomplice)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency review of evidence)
- Davis v. State, 283 Ga. 438 (2008) (recantation is generally merely impeaching; perjury conviction exception noted)
- Norwood v. State, 273 Ga. 352 (2001) (recantation rules and standards for new trial)
- Fugitt v. State, 251 Ga. 451 (1983) (new trial required where trial testimony proven impossible)
- Burke v. State, 205 Ga. 656 (1949) (upholding perjury‑conviction requirement for vacating verdict)
- Williams v. State, 291 Ga. 19 (2012) (Georgia murder sentencing scheme history and challenges)
- Babbage v. State, 296 Ga. 364 (2015) (Apprendi/Alleyne challenges to life‑without‑parole sentencing addressed)
- Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (facts increasing mandatory minimum must be found by a jury, but does not require jury find every fact that influences judicial discretion)