528 B.R. 655
Bankr. W.D. Va.2015Background
- Debtor Clyde A. Long, Jr. was subject to state criminal conviction(s) and a civil judgment (including a default/consent judgment and a promissory note) arising from sexual conduct with a minor; creditor Lewis sought to except the resulting debt from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
- At trial Lewis presented the state conviction, default judgment, and promissory note but offered little direct evidence of Long’s mens rea; Long contested dischargeability and moved for judgment on partial findings after the close of Lewis’s case.
- The bankruptcy court initially granted partial judgment for Long, finding Lewis failed to show by a preponderance that Long’s debt arose from a willful and malicious injury as required by § 523(a)(6).
- The District Court remanded limited questions about whether the bankruptcy court thought intent can be inferred (as in Doe v. Fleetwood and T.K. v. Love) or whether those cases were factually distinguishable.
- On remand the bankruptcy court clarified it disagrees with Fleetwood and Love and holds that § 523(a)(6) requires proof of willful and malicious intent to injure — intent cannot be inferred solely from the nature of the underlying offense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether intent to injure under § 523(a)(6) may be inferred from the nature of the underlying offense (strict‑liability or sexual-offense facts) | Lewis: the statutory-rape/sexual-offense nature of the conduct (and related judgments) establishes willfulness and malice as a matter of law | Long: Geiger requires proof of intent to injure; intent cannot be presumed from the act alone | Court: Intent cannot be inferred from the nature of the offense; plaintiff must prove willful and malicious intent to injure by a preponderance |
| Whether a criminal conviction or a civil default/consent judgment automatically establishes willful and malicious intent for § 523(a)(6) purposes | Lewis: conviction, default judgment, and promissory note (admitting settlement of an intentional tort) establish intent | Long: those documents do not necessarily establish intent to injure; collateral estoppel not automatically satisfied | Court: Such documents do not automatically prove willful and malicious intent; collateral estoppel may apply in some cases but was not established here |
| Whether the bankruptcy court should follow Fleetwood and Love (which inferred intent for sexual‑assault cases) | Lewis: other bankruptcy courts have held similar offenses per se willful and malicious | Long: those decisions are wrong as a matter of law under Supreme Court precedent | Court: Disagrees with Fleetwood and Love; will not adopt an inferred‑intent rule |
| Whether Lewis met her burden of proof at trial to except the debt from discharge | Lewis: relied on prior judgments and conviction as establishing requisite elements | Long: challenged sufficiency of evidence; moved for judgment on partial findings | Court: Lewis failed to prove by a preponderance that Long acted willfully and maliciously; judgment for Long |
Key Cases Cited
- Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998) (§ 523(a)(6) requires intent to cause injury, not merely an intentional act)
- Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904) (historical decision holding certain torts to be "wilful" under earlier law; limited by Geiger)
- T.K. v. Love (In re Love), 347 B.R. 362 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006) (bankruptcy court held sexual‑molestation judgment nondischargeable by inferring intent)
- B.B. v. Continental Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 1288 (8th Cir. 1993) (Eighth Circuit adopted inferred‑intent theory in insurance indemnity context for sexual‑assault judgments)
- In re Stage, 321 B.R. 486 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2005) (a presumption of harm is not equivalent to proving intent to harm; judgment did not establish malicious intent)