Lewis v. Lead Industries Ass'n
2020 IL 124107
| Ill. | 2020Background
- Parents (class action) sued former manufacturers of white lead pigments alleging a conspiracy to conceal lead hazards; the only surviving count is civil conspiracy grounded in allegations of intentional misrepresentation/fraud.
- Plaintiffs sought only reimbursement of costs for mandatory blood-lead screening required by statute; they expressly disclaimed any claim for physical injury to their children.
- Class definition excluded “parents or legal guardians who incurred no expense, obligation or liability for lead toxicity testing of their children.”
- Two named plaintiffs (Lewis and Banks) were Medicaid recipients whose children’s screenings were paid entirely by Medicaid; they incurred no out-of-pocket expense or liability. A third plaintiff (O’Sullivan) had private insurance but presented no evidence of payment.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment for defendants (no injury to Medicaid recipients; collateral source rule inapplicable to create injury). The appellate court reversed as to Lewis and Banks, relying on the Family Expense Act and the collateral source rule. The Illinois Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs suffered the actual economic injury required to sustain an intentional-misrepresentation-based tort (and thus civil conspiracy) when Medicaid paid all testing costs | Lewis: parent incurs the expense of services even if a third party paid; collateral source rule preserves plaintiff’s right to recover billed costs | Defendants: no out-of-pocket loss or liability occurred; plaintiffs therefore lack injury and standing | Plaintiffs lacked the required actual economic loss; no injury, so the tort and conspiracy claims fail |
| Whether the Family Expense Act made parents legally obligated to pay providers (giving plaintiffs an injury) | Plaintiffs: Family Expense Act codifies parent liability for child medical expenses, creating the obligation | Defendants: Medicaid and regulations prevent providers from billing recipients; no creditor-debtor relationship arose | Family Expense Act does not create liability where none existed; Medicaid rules and statutory scheme prevent providers from becoming creditors of recipients |
| Whether the State’s statutory right to recoup from tort recoveries creates a liability for recipients (thus establishing injury) | Plaintiffs: State’s subrogation/recoupment rights mean recipients have a contingent liability | Defendants: State’s remedies target the wrongdoer’s recovery, not the recipient; federal law bars seeking repayment from recipients | State’s recoupment/subrogation rights do not create liability on recipients; any recovery is taken from judgment against wrongdoer before payment to recipient |
| Whether the collateral source rule can be used to establish injury or standing in a pure economic-loss case | Plaintiffs: collateral source rule prevents reduction of recoverable damages even if third party paid | Defendants: collateral source rule does not create the threshold injury element or standing | Collateral source rule governs damages measurement, not whether an injury occurred; it cannot supply standing where there is no actual loss |
Key Cases Cited
- Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69 (1982) (economic-loss rule barring tort recovery for purely economic losses absent certain exceptions)
- In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179 (1997) (recognized exceptions to the economic-loss rule for fraud/intentional misrepresentation)
- Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill. 2d 393 (2008) (collateral source rule and reasonable-value approach to medical damages)
- Graul v. Adrian, 32 Ill. 2d 345 (1965) (parental recovery for a child’s medical expenses arising from the child’s physical injury)
- Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 164 Ill. 2d 54 (1994) (civil conspiracy extends tort liability to conspirators who planned or aided the wrong)
- McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill. 2d 102 (1999) (elements and scope of civil conspiracy)
