Lewis v. Hobbs
2014 Ark. 407
| Ark. | 2014Background
- David Lee Lewis was convicted in 1984 of first-degree battery and aggravated robbery and originally sentenced to 720 months; convictions were reversed and he was retried and in 1985 convicted again and sentenced as a habitual offender to consecutive terms of 360 months (aggravated robbery) and 288 months (battery).
- In 2012 Lewis filed pro se petitions in Jefferson County seeking declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus challenging ADC's calculation of his parole-eligibility date and claiming he had been eligible for release since 2005.
- The circuit court denied relief; Lewis appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, raising the same claims.
- The court reviewed statutory parole rules in effect at the time of the offenses (1984): Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2807.1 barred parole for aggravated robbery recidivists; § 43-2830.3 limited parole for third offenders to after serving three-fourths of the sentence (with good-time credit), and consecutive sentences are aggregated for parole purposes but cannot create parole eligibility for a sentence that itself prohibits parole.
- The court found the judgment-and-commitment reflected consecutive, not concurrent, sentences, and that Lewis failed to show ADC miscalculated his parole-eligibility date under controlling law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parole eligibility for aggravated-robbery sentence | Lewis argued his 360-month aggravated-robbery sentence should permit parole earlier (and that he was eligible since 2005). | Hobbs/ADC argued Lewis is ineligible for parole on the 360-month aggravated-robbery sentence under the 1983 statute because of a prior aggravated-robbery conviction. | Court held Lewis is ineligible for parole on the 360-month sentence under § 43-2807.1. |
| Aggregation of consecutive sentences for parole | Lewis argued his sentences run concurrently or otherwise make him eligible earlier. | ADC maintained sentences were ordered consecutive and must be aggregated subject to statutory limits. | Court held sentences were consecutive; aggregation applies but cannot create parole eligibility where statute forbids it, so must serve full 360 months then three-fourths of 288 months. |
| Application of meritorious good-time credit | Lewis contended meritorious good-time reduced his 360-month sentence (he claimed ~10 years). | ADC argued § 43-2807.1 does not allow good-time credit to make an otherwise ineligible sentence parole-eligible. | Court held good-time does not authorize parole for a sentence that the statute bars from parole. |
| Availability of declaratory judgment and mandamus relief | Lewis sought declaratory relief and mandamus to compel ADC to change his parole calculation. | ADC argued the claims are nonjusticiable or do not show a clear right to relief; parole determinations are for ADC and mandamus won't control discretion. | Court affirmed denial: no justiciable entitlement established and mandamus inappropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lewis v. State, 286 Ark. 372, 691 S.W.2d 864 (1985) (prior reversal and remand for new trial on original convictions)
- Lewis v. State, 288 Ark. 595, 709 S.W.2d 56 (1986) (affirming convictions after retrial)
- Wiggins v. State, 299 Ark. 180, 771 S.W.2d 759 (declaratory-judgment petition is civil in nature)
- Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ross-Lawhon, 290 Ark. 578, 721 S.W.2d 658 (standards for declaratory relief and justiciability)
- Woods v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 37, 727 S.W.2d 849 (aggregation cannot create parole eligibility for a sentence that is statutorily ineligible)
- Crawford v. Cashion, 361 S.W.3d 268 (Ark. 2010) (mandamus and declaratory relief standards reaffirmed)