Lewis, Gordon Ray
PD-0173-15
| Tex. App. | Mar 20, 2015Background
- Defendant Gordon Ray Lewis was convicted of capital murder for the January 2012 killing of Gene Sabin and sentenced to life imprisonment; the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed on December 18, 2014.
- At trial, a firearms examiner testified that a spent casing at the scene was loaded in the same magazine as unfired rounds recovered from a truck associated with co‑defendant Justin Ragan; the expert relied on magazine‑lip/toolmark comparison without recovering the murder weapon or the actual magazine.
- Lewis’s mother, Karen Adams, had been previously convicted of felony retaliation for threats that included Judge Ralph Walton (the trial judge); she testified as an alibi witness at Lewis’s trial.
- Lewis moved to recuse Judge Walton under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b (appearance of partiality); the recusal motion was referred to another judge (Judge Walker) and denied after a hearing.
- Lewis challenged (1) the denial of recusal and (2) admission of the toolmark/magazine‑lip identification under Sexton v. State and Kelly reliability standards; he also raised Brady and sufficiency claims on appeal.
- The court of appeals rejected Lewis’s recusal, expert‑evidence, Brady, and sufficiency challenges and affirmed the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Lewis's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recusal of Judge Walton under Rule 18b (appearance of impartiality) | Walton’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned because Lewis’s mother had been convicted of threatening Walton and then testified as an alibi witness at Lewis’s trial | No evidence Judge Walton was biased against Lewis; prior conviction of a witness does not automatically make the presiding judge appear partial | Denial of recusal upheld; no abuse of discretion — reasonable‑person standard not met |
| Admissibility of magazine‑lip/toolmark identification (Kelly/Sexton reliability) | Testimony was unreliable under Sexton because the magazine and weapon were not recovered and supporting literature was not admitted into the record | Expert provided methodological explanation, training, peer‑reviewed articles (provided to court), verification procedures, and error‑rate testimony — sufficient clear and convincing showing | Trial court did not abuse discretion; expert testimony admitted and appellate court distinguished Sexton on the record presented |
| Brady (failure to disclose impeachment/exculpatory evidence re: witness Bryce Cobbs) | State withheld interview of Cobbs by a Texas Ranger which could undermine prosecution witness Cleere | Cobbs was discoverable via public databases; interview corroborated prosecution view that Cobbs did not recall event; nondisclosure not material or favorable | No Brady violation; post‑trial evidence was neutral and not material |
| Sufficiency of evidence supporting capital murder conviction | Circumstantial proof only; argued evidence insufficient | Cumulative circumstantial evidence showed conspiracy, provisioning/possession of gun, DNA, money, admissions, and statements by Ragan; jury could find Lewis criminally responsible | Evidence sufficient under Jackson; conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 566 U.S. 868 (2009) (due‑process concern where judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned)
- Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) (standards for judicial disqualification and the limited role of judicial remarks/attitude)
- Sexton v. State, 93 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (toolmark/magazine‑lip comparison may be unreliable where key comparative items are unavailable)
- Whitehead v. State, 273 S.W.3d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (judge as "injured party" in disqualification context where threats referenced the judge)
- Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (test for admissibility/reliability of scientific expert testimony)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
- Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (criminal‑case standard that proponent must prove scientific evidence reliable by clear and convincing evidence)
