Lewis Duckett v. Marcia Fuller, 819 F.3d 740

Background

In 2010, inmate Bernard McFadden sued SCDC employees alleging Eighth Amendment violations from deficient prison food; that suit was dismissed on the merits.
In 2013 Lewis Duckett and 15 other Kershaw inmates (pro se) filed a class-labeled complaint, drafted by McFadden, alleging essentially the same Eighth Amendment food claims.
The district court severed the 16-plaintiff filing into separate actions; Duckett paid his own filing fee and supplemented the complaint with individualized injury allegations.
Defendants moved to dismiss Duckett’s suit under Rule 12(b)(6) as barred by res judicata based on McFadden’s 2010 dismissal; the magistrate recommended denial but the district court granted dismissal, finding Duckett in privity with McFadden.
On appeal the Fourth Circuit examined whether Duckett, a nonparty to McFadden I, could be precluded by res judicata under the Supreme Court’s nonparty-preclusion framework in Taylor v. Sturgell.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding the defendants failed to show any Taylor exception applied to bind Duckett to McFadden’s prior judgment.

Issues

Issue	Duckett's Argument	Defendants' Argument	Held
Whether Duckett (a nonparty to McFadden I) is precluded from relitigating essentially identical Eighth Amendment claims by McFadden I’s judgment	Duckett: Not bound because he was not a party, had no opportunity to participate, and no Taylor exception applies	Defendants: Duckett is in privity/virtually represented by McFadden (or acting as McFadden’s agent), so Taylor exceptions apply	Held: Reversed — Duckett is not precluded; defendants failed to meet burden to show any Taylor exception applies
Whether the district court properly equated "privity" with nonparty preclusion without applying Taylor’s six exceptions	Duckett: Taylor governs and privity cannot substitute for analysis under Taylor	Defendants: Traditional privity/virtual representation doctrine supports preclusion	Held: Taylor controls; the court must analyze Taylor’s six exceptions rather than rely on broad privity doctrine
Whether McFadden’s role in drafting the complaint or providing jailhouse-lawyer assistance makes Duckett an agent/proxy of McFadden (Taylor exception 5)	Duckett: He pursued his own claim, paid fee, and supplied individualized allegations; assistance does not prove agency/control	Defendants: Drafting and aligned interests show Duckett acted as McFadden’s proxy to relitigate	Held: Not proven — jailhouse-lawyer assistance alone insufficient to show agency/control; exception 5 inapplicable
Whether any other Taylor exceptions (agreement to be bound; pre-existing legal relationship; adequate representation; control of litigation; statutory scheme) apply	Duckett: None apply	Defendants: Argued privity and agent/proxy; briefly suggested pre-existing relationship	Held: Four exceptions clearly inapplicable; no record of qualifying substantive legal relationship; thus Taylor exceptions not satisfied

Key Cases Cited

Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (identifies exhaustive six exceptions for binding nonparties to judgments)
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) (explains policy rationales for claim preclusion)
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979) (discusses assumption of control and related preclusion principles)
In re Varat Enters., Inc., 81 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1996) (elements of claim preclusion under federal law)
Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793 (1996) (right to a day in court; limits on binding nonparties)
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (addresses preclusion and nonlitigant rights)
Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521 (4th Cir. 2000) (permitting judicial notice of prior court records)