Lewars v. State, 2D15-3471

Dazarian Lewars was convicted by a jury of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and grand theft; trial court sentenced him as a Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) to 15 years on the burglary count and concurrent lesser term on theft.
Lewars had an earlier case (09-CF-20276) with multiple probation violations; at final VOP the court sentenced him to 24 months "committed to the custody of the [DOC]" but awarded 766 days' jail credit, resulting in immediate release from county jail and never entering a DOC facility.
Less than two months after that release from county jail, Lewars committed the burglary/theft at issue.
The State argued Lewars qualified as a PRR because he had been legally committed to DOC custody and DOC had authorized his release (i.e., a "constructive" release from DOC).
Lewars argued PRR status requires actual release from a DOC-operated correctional facility, and because he never physically entered or was released from a DOC facility, he did not qualify.
The trial court imposed PRR sentencing; on appeal the Second District affirmed the convictions but reversed the PRR sentence, remanding for resentencing and certifying conflict with three other districts.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Lewars)	Held
Whether Lewars qualifies as a PRR under § 775.082(9)(a)(1)	A defendant committed to DOC custody but released from county jail by DOC authorization is constructively released from a DOC facility and thus qualifies as a PRR	PRR requires release from a state correctional facility; Lewars never entered or was released from a DOC facility, so he does not qualify	Lewars does not qualify as a PRR under the plain language of the statute; PRR sentence reversed and remanded for resentencing
Whether courts should apply the absurdity doctrine to expand the statute	Not argued by State on appeal; other districts invoked it to avoid what they saw as an absurd loophole	Lewars argued plain text controls; policy-based expansion is improper	Court declined to apply the absurdity doctrine; various non-absurd legislative reasons justify statutory limits

State v. Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92 (Fla. 2012) (statutory interpretation: start with plain language)
Atwater v. Kortum, 95 So. 3d 85 (Fla. 2012) (use common and ordinary meaning in construing statutes)
Donato v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 767 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 2000) (statutory language construed by ordinary meaning)
Thompson v. State, 695 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1997) (phrases construed in context)
Burgess v. State, 198 So. 3d 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (ambiguity required to resort to other rules)
Louzon v. State, 78 So. 3d 678 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (held constructive/DOC custody sufficed for PRR)
Taylor v. State, 114 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (adopted Louzon reasoning re: constructive release)
State v. Wright, 180 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (held release from county jail with DOC commitment could be treated as constructive DOC release for PRR)
McDade v. State, 154 So. 3d 292 (Fla. 2014) (courts may not add words to statutes)
Quetglas, 901 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2005) (expressio unius canon limits statutory expansion)
Maddox v. State, 923 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2006) (absurdity doctrine narrow exception to plain meaning)
Plante v. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1979) (textual absurdity test)
Sanders v. State, 35 So. 3d 864 (Fla. 2010) (use of dictionary definitions when word undefined)