Levine v. Saul
1:19-cv-00569
| D.R.I. | Sep 3, 2020Background:
- Plaintiff Rob Levine, a Rhode Island attorney who represents Social Security claimants, sued the SSA Commissioner seeking a declaratory judgment that 20 C.F.R. § 404.1707 (and its Title XVI analogue) is invalid because it conflicts with 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)(1) and 5 U.S.C. § 500(b).
- § 404.1707 requires a claimant to sign a written notice (commonly Form SSA‑1696) designating a representative; POMS guidance has long interpreted that notice to require a claimant signature (and historically wet‑ink signatures).
- Levine argues the statutes set the sole admission requirements for attorneys representing claimants and that the regulation unlawfully adds a claimant‑signature prerequisite that functions as an extra admission hoop.
- The Commissioner defended the regulation as a claimant‑notice/consent rule (protecting confidential information) that does not alter attorney eligibility under § 406(a)(1) or § 500(b).
- The parties cross‑moved; the Magistrate Judge concluded the case presented a pure statutory‑interpretation question, declined to address POMS wet‑ink issues (not challenged here), and recommended granting the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss on the merits and denying Levine’s summary judgment motion as moot.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 404.1707 conflicts with 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)(1) | § 406(a)(1) alone governs attorney eligibility; a claimant signature requirement unlawfully adds to admission requirements | § 404.1707 governs claimant notice/consent, not attorney admission; it does not add eligibility requirements | No conflict; § 404.1707 regulates claimant notice and does not contravene § 406(a)(1) |
| Whether § 404.1707 conflicts with 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) | § 500(b) fixes the procedural means (attorney declaration) and forecloses agency‑added prerequisites | Either § 500(b) does not displace program‑specific § 406, or even if applicable, § 404.1707 is not inconsistent with § 500(b) | No conflict; court assumed § 500(b) may apply but found § 404.1707 not inconsistent with it |
| Whether the POMS wet‑ink signature rule is at issue | Plaintiff referenced wet‑ink concerns and objected to electronic signature refusals | Commissioner noted POMS wet‑ink is interpretation/implementation and has been temporarily suspended; wet‑ink not challenged here | Not decided — the court expressly did not reach the POMS wet‑ink issue because the challenge targeted the regulation’s notice requirement only |
| Jurisdiction/justiciability and remedy | Levine sought declaratory relief; alleged injury from delays/lost clients | Commissioner initially challenged jurisdiction but later limited that defense; no SSA claim exhaustion issue here | Court accepted federal question jurisdiction and 5 U.S.C. § 702 waiver for suit; dismissed on the merits (regulation upheld) |
Key Cases Cited
- Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (agency rules promulgated under a delegation carry the force of law)
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (statutory interpretation begins with the statute's plain text)
- Me. Pooled Disability Trust v. Hamilton, 927 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2019) (interpretation grounded in statute as a whole and context)
- Cordoba v. Massanari, 256 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2001) (§ 406 permits attorneys in good standing to represent claimants before SSA)
- Polydoroff v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 773 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (§ 500(b) prohibits agencies from imposing supplemental admission requirements)
- McDaniel v. Israel, 534 F. Supp. 367 (W.D. Va. 1982) (district court decision holding § 404.1707 conflicted with § 500; court here declined to follow it)