LEVECQUE v. ARGO MARKETING GROUP INC
2:14-cv-00218
D. Me.Jun 12, 2015Background
- Plaintiffs are current and former Argo Marketing Group call-center employees who sued under the FLSA for unpaid overtime, alleging unpaid “lag time” during software log‑ins, unpaid bathroom breaks, and unpaid rest breaks.
- Five named plaintiffs filed a collective action; six individuals have already filed opt‑in consents. Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification and court‑facilitated notice; Defendants opposed.
- Plaintiffs submitted four affidavits (plus one supplement) mainly from Portland and Pittsfield employees describing common time‑keeping practices and alleged unpaid time; Defendants submitted declarations (including Lewiston employees and management) asserting written policies, training, and that no systemic unpaid time existed.
- The district court applied the two‑stage (conditional/decertification) FLSA framework and the lenient “modest factual showing” standard for conditional certification at the notice stage.
- The court granted conditional certification for a collective including customer service representatives and sales personnel at all Argo Maine locations (Portland, Pittsfield, Lewiston) and those working from home, using a three‑year limitations window to facilitate notice.
- The court denied Plaintiffs’ request to appoint class representatives and class counsel and directed the parties to meet and confer on the form of notice under Hoffman‑LaRoche.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether conditional certification for FLSA collective is appropriate | LeVecque: modest factual showing via affidavits that similarly situated employees exist and share a common unlawful practice (unpaid lag time, breaks). | Argo: plaintiffs’ few affidavits are insufficient; lawful written policies and training exist and any violations were isolated at smaller locations. | Granted: court found plaintiffs met the lenient ‘‘modest factual showing’’ standard for conditional certification. |
| Geographic scope — extend notice to Lewiston and remote workers | Plaintiffs: declarations state locations operated similarly; at least one declarant known of company‑wide policies. | Argo: plaintiffs lack firsthand Lewiston evidence; conditions may vary by site. | Granted: court concluded affidavits were sufficient at notice stage to include Lewiston and at‑home workers; differences better addressed at decertification. |
| Inclusion of sales personnel in collective | Plaintiffs: sales duties overlap with customer service; at least one declarant worked as sales and reported same unpaid time. | Argo: duties/pay differ; inclusion would be improper without stronger proof. | Granted: court found a modest showing that sales personnel are similarly situated for conditional certification. |
| Impact of Supreme Court decisions (Comcast, RBS Citizens) on FLSA conditional certification | Plaintiffs: Comcast concerns are Rule 23 matters and inapplicable to the FLSA’s more lenient standard at the notice stage. | Argo: Comcast/RBS require more rigorous class scrutiny, including on damages and individualized issues. | Denied for defendants: court held Comcast/RBS do not alter FLSA two‑stage, lenient notice‑stage analysis. |
Key Cases Cited
- Prescott v. Prudential Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 2d 357 (D. Me. 2010) (explains two‑stage FLSA collective certification and applies a lenient notice‑stage standard)
- Hoffman‑La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989) (district courts may facilitate judicial oversight of notice to potential FLSA plaintiffs)
- Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 2008) (describes two‑stage collective action framework)
- Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2001) (discusses lenient initial notice‑stage standard for collective actions)
- Comer v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 454 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2006) (articulates modest factual showing needed at notice stage)
- O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2009) (factors for decertification/second‑stage analysis)
- Thiessen v. GE Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2001) (employees similarly situated are those victimized by a common decision, policy, or plan)
- Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (Rule 23 class‑certification rigor on damages; court held it does not control FLSA notice‑stage)
- RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Ross, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013) (mem. decision remanding in light of Comcast)
